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Scope-of-Protection Problems With 
Patents and Copyrights on Methods of 
Doing Business 
Richard H. Stern* 
INTRODUCTION 
The problem of determining whether a method of doing busi-
ness should be eligible for patent or copyright protection has be-
come of increasing concern after the Federal Circuit’s remarkable 
decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial 
Group, Inc., and the Supreme Court’s denial of further review.1  
The decision introduces substantial tension into patent law by 
opening up a whole new realm of potentially patentable innova-
tions of a kind previously considered unpatentable in principle or 
patentable only by substantial indirection and elaborate apparatus-
seeking gymnastics.2  The problems of patenting business methods 
 
  * Professorial Lecturer in Law, The George Washington University Law School.  
Member, District of Columbia Bar.  The many helpful suggestions of Professor Leo J. 
Raskind are gratefully acknowledged.  This paper is a revised version of a paper with the 
same title delivered at the second annual symposium on intellectual property rights in 
computer-related technology at The George Washington University Law School, March 
25, 1999.  The preparation of this paper was supported by a grant from Oracle Corpora-
tion, cosponsor of the symposium. 
1. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev’g 927 F. Supp. 502 (D. Mass. 1995), cert. de-
nied, 119 S. Ct. 851 (1999). 
2. See Richard H. Stern, Federal Circuit Equates Methods of Doing Business to Al-
gorithms for Patentability Purposes, 11 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 496, 498-99, 500 (1994).  
The article discusses how one might, through such indirection and gymnastics, convert an 
appparently unpatentable business method into a hardware apparatus-utilizing and therefore 
patentable system.  The article illustrates how to perform such a conversion with the subject 
matter claimed in the patent rejected in In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  The 
problem for a claims drafter seeking to make this kind of conversion is to insert nominal 
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can be addressed instructively from several different vantage 
points. 
A.  Several Approaches to the Problem 
One approach is classical doctrinal analysis.  How do patents 
on methods of doing business square with previously accepted case 
law on patenting abstract ideas, methods of doing calculations, and 
methods of doing business?  Another approach is that of economic 
policy.  Will patents on methods of doing business bring forth 
more, and a richer variety of, new financial products and business 
services, to a sought-for extent?  Or will that effect, if there is one, 
be outweighed by their hindering competitive vigor and the enter-
prise of other entrepreneurs? 
Still another approach is philosophico-historical.  Will recogni-
tion of property rights in business techniques, business models, and 
ideas for transacting business in more effective ways by use of 
computers or electronic-commerce expedients harm society?  
Would such patents push us into the abuses that led to the Statute 
of Monopolies,3 The Boston Tea Party, and the French Revolu-
tion?  Are the new patents on methods of doing business the mod-
ern equivalent of the hated gabelle and East India Company’s tea 
monopoly?  Will business-methods patents be perceived as so ex-
cessive as to initiate a cycle of hostile reaction against the patent 
system? 
Finally, an ultra-pragmatic approach might ask whether patents 
on methods of doing business would do less overall harm to soci-
ety than expansive copyright protection on them would.  If that is 
so, should we therefore acquiesce in such patents as a lesser evil 
 
apparatus limitations into the claim, such as a particular transducer or even an analog-to-
digital converter at the front end of the system or an output-utilizing device at the back end.  
The device inserted must be one that would in any event be essential to operating the sys-
tem, and thus one that would-be infringers could not avoid.  Such a device limitation would 
not appreciably decrease the economic scope of the patent monopoly.  The actual limitation 
that the carefully selected apparatus limitation imposed on claim scope would then be illu-
sory, but the existence of the limitation would avoid § 101-invoking “preemption” of all 
ways to practice the business method.  See Richard H. Stern, Tales from the Algorithm War: 
Benson to Iwahashi, It’s Deja Vu All Over Again, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 371, 382-84 (1990); see 
also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining patent-eligible subject matter). 
3. Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. I, ch. 3 (1623). 
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than copyright excess would be, even if not a greater good?4 
Each of these approaches has its advantages and its shortcom-
ings, some of which this paper explores.  This paper seeks to com-
plement the analyses of other contributions to this Symposium by 
examining patents and copyrights on methods of doing business 
from a different perspective.  This paper focuses first on the prob-
lem qua problem: Why is there a sensed problem with patents and 
copyrights on methods of doing business?  Is the problem, assum-
ing that there is one, specific to patents and copyrights on methods 
of doing business or is it simply a facet of a more general problem 
in intellectual property law?  Is the problem, again assuming that 
there is one, a problem with all patents and copyrights on methods 
of doing business or only some of them, a subset?  If the problem 
is specific to a subset, what differentiates the subset from the rest 
of the set?  Finally, if there indeed is a problem, and we want to 
deal with it, how might we go about doing so? 
B.   The Relation of Scope of Protection to Location on an 
Abstractness-Specificity Continuum 
A thesis developed in this paper is that the perceived problem 
with patents and copyrights on methods of doing business is an as-
pect of one of the most fundamental and pervasive patent and 
copyright problems.  This is the problem of establishing workable 
criteria for a line of demarcation in intellectual property law.  On 
the one side of the line are the legally protectable, concrete, and 
specific aspects of innovative contributions.  On the other side are 
the legally unprotectable, abstract, and general aspects of those 
contributions. 
 
4. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 
740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990), overruled by implication, Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland 
Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 
(1996); Pearl Sys., Inc. v. Competition Elecs., Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1520 (S.D. Fla. 1988). 
 The thrust of this argument would be that a parallel evolution of business-method copy-
rights to that of “look and feel” copyrights in the computer program field would, at least for 
a time, be more disastrous than stretching patent law.  The underlying premise, perhaps 
valid, is that patent law arguably is not as bad a fit to the subject matter as copyright law is.  
I am indebted to Professor Dennis Karjala for this concept of according patent-eligibility as 
a damage control measure. 
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In copyright law, this is the problem of distinguishing legally 
protected expression from legally unprotected idea.  (An idea is in-
stantiated, so to say, by means of particular verbal, pictorial, or 
other concrete expressions of the idea.  An archetype is projected 
or limned against the wall of the cave as a particular shadow.)  The 
Supreme Court seminally addressed that problem in Baker v. Sel-
den5 and its attempted solution is now codified in large part in sec-
tion 102(b) of our copyright statute.6  Sometimes idea/expression is 
seen as a copyrightability issue and sometimes it is seen as an in-
fringement or copyright scope issue.7 
Courts often seek to resolve the problem in copyright law by 
applying the so-called merger rule.  Under this legal rule, the court 
analyzes a work by characterizing it successively along a contin-
uum from concreteness (specificity) to abstractness (generality).  
At each point, features of the work may be considered part of its 
protected expression or part of its unprotected idea.  A principal 
factor in making this determination is whether holding that a given 
feature is a protected expression leaves little or no alternative pos-
sible unprotected expression available for use by others who might 
want to embody the same ideas into their own works in a function-
ally satisfactory way.  When possible alternatives are few or non-
 
5. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).  See discussion, infra, Part I.A. 
6. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) (stating: “In no case does copyright protection for an 
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of op-
eration, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, ex-
plained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”). 
7. Under a copyrightability analysis, the issue is whether the subject is the kind of 
thing that copyright law will protect at all.  Under an infringement or scope analysis, the 
issue is the extent to which and circumstances in which copyright law will protect the sub-
ject.  The First Circuit, in such decisions as Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 
675 (1st Cir. 1967); and Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), 
aff’d by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996), has preferred a copyrightability 
analysis.  Most other circuits, particularly the Ninth Circuit, have preferred a copyright 
scope/infringement analysis..  See Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 
1988); see also Kregos v. Press, Inc., 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991).  As Judge Boudin 
pointed out in his concurring opinion in the Borland case, a copyrightability analysis forces 
a less nuanced treatment of the issues, but it may be less costly to administer.  Borland, 49 
F.3d at 819 (Boudin, J., concurring).  A copyrightability analysis leads to a yes/no “digital” 
determination while an infringement analysis leads to a sliding-scale “analog” determina-
tion.  The digital analysis may lead to greater predictability and thus greater certainty of 
business and investment expectations, but the result may be less intuitively satisfying. 
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existent, expression is said to merge into idea, and thus become in-
eligible for copyright protection.8 
In patent law, the corresponding problem, seminally addressed 
in O’Reilly v. Morse,9 is that of distinguishing unpatentable idea 
and potentially patentable embodiment of idea.  Courts have vari-
ously tried to bridle the problem with patent law’s doctrine of non-
statutory subject matter and by requiring that disclosure must sup-
port claims.  These doctrines are now embodied, respectively, in 
sections 101 and 112 of our patent code.10  Probably, every patent 
that has been issued over the last century or more has addressed 
this problem to some degree, since under our “peripheral claiming” 
system a patent customarily ends with at least one independent 
claim and several claims depending from it, often drafted in a tree-
like logical structure.  Each level of remove along the logical tree 
away from the independent claim is characterized by the addition 
of at least one further limitation to the claim, i.e., an additional 
predicate defining, and thus narrowing the scope of, the claimed 
subject matter.  Each time a drafter of claims progresses from in-
dependent claim to dependent claim to further dependent claim, the 
drafter moves from the generic to the specific, from the more ab-
stract to the more concrete, from essence to accident. 
Broadly stated, this pervasive copyright and patent law prob-
lem, by no means limited to methods of doing business, is one of 
titrating the scope of intellectual property rights.  Scope of copy-
right or patent protection must be determined as a function of the 
 
8. See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 
1993); Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).  The concept 
extends to treating form dictated by function as within the merger doctrine.  Thus, when a 
particular medium of expression requires certain features or treatments, the similarity that 
results is not “substantial similarity” under copyright law.  See, e.g., Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc. 
124 F.3d 1366, 1374 (10th Cir. 1997); CMM Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean Coast Prop., Inc., 97 
F.3d 1504, 1519-20 (1st Cir. 1996); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1546-47 
(11th Cir. 1996); Gates, 9 F.3d at 838.  As the CMM opinion points out, lack of originality 
is an alternative legal doctrine for reaching the same conclusion, 97 F.3d at 1521. 
9. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).  The decision and its facts are discussed infra, text 
accompanying notes 39-42. 
10. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112 (1994).  The doctrine of nonstatutory subject matter is 
comparable to a copyrightability analysis, while upholding only those claims supported by 
the disclosure is comparable to a copyright scope/infringement analysis.  Enablement and 
description are patent invalidity issues, however, not patent infringement issues. 
STERNFMTNOPIX.DOC 9/29/2006  3:27 PM 
110 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 10:105 
values of appropriate factual parameters concerning the subject 
matter protected.  Assuming that some kind of intellectual contri-
bution is present, what should be the scope of the monopoly or 
property right that the public should concede to the person assert-
ing a claim to such rights?11 
At one extreme of a possible scope-of-protection continuum 
(the “stingy” end), legal protection to be accorded could be so nar-
row that it is limited to the contributor’s specific disclosure.  This 
could be, for example, the identical words of a poem or every me-
chanical feature of a machine, no matter how accidental and non-
essential the feature is.  Limiting legal protection to things at the 
stingy end of the continuum would defeat the policy of intellectual 
property law to encourage the progress of knowledge and technol-
ogy by offering incentive payments.  At the other end of the scope 
continuum (the “spendthrift” end) is a concept of protected subject 
matter so generic, sweeping, and abstracted in formulation that it 
extends to poems as yet unwritten and machines that are not now, 
and may never be, devised.  Yet, the claimant of rights has by no 
means placed the public into possession of such things.  Hence, ac-
cording legal protection for things at the spendthrift end of the con-
tinuum would overpay authors and inventors, unwisely impede 
competition, and senselessly mulct the public.  By what criteria or 
parameters should the appropriate scope of intellectual property 
 
11. Scope, itself, may be described in terms of several different parameters.  Tem-
poral duration of protection is one parameter, for example.  Another parameter is the 
kinds of acts against which protection attaches “for example, manufacture (reproduction), 
use, sale (distribution), offer for sale, and importation” are generic categories of this kind.  
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. 98 ); 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994).  A related parameter is 
the kind of relief to which a proprietor of intellectual property rights is entitled to, such as 
“injunctions, the proprietor’s lost profits, the infringer’s profits, exemplary damages, and 
so on.”  A complementary parameter is the exceptions, or defenses, that the law carves 
out from a proprietor’s rights “such as fair use, form dictated by function, the merger 
doctrine, pedagogical or noncommercial use, the first sale/exhaustion doctrine.” 
 Another parameter is the breadth of legally protected subject matter similar to that 
which the innovator identified to the government, or claimed from it, at the time of the grant 
of statutory protection.  This is the zone in which legal protection applies in relation to 
competitive subject matter accused of infringement.  Intellectual property law has at times 
addressed this parameter in terms of such doctrines as substantial similarity (copyright law) 
and the doctrine of equivalents (patent law).  In this paper, scope of protection is addressed 
mainly in terms of this parameter or sense of scope.  The term “preemptive scope” is some-
times used in this paper to clarify that this sense of scope of protection is used. 
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protection be measured? 
C.  Enabling Disclosure and Its Limits As a Measure 
One parameter, which patent law has emphasized, is the 
amount of disclosure made that enables the public to practice the 
invention.  The sensed problem with patents on methods of doing 
business increases in proportion to the breadth of scope of protec-
tion i.e., in proportion to the preemptive scope of the intellectual 
property rights accorded their proprietors.  At the same time, it 
may be concluded that the sensed problem decreases in proportion 
to the amount of enabling disclosure or in proportion to the ratio of 
such disclosure to the breadth of preemption.  This principle may 
go a long way toward resolving at least some problems perceived 
with intellectual property rights in methods of doing business. 
But the enablement principle has its limitations and perhaps it 
collides with other principles.  The problem with intellectual prop-
erty on methods of doing business may not always evaporate when 
vast enabling disclosure is made.  To put it somewhat differently, it 
remains to be decided whether some quantum of legal protection 
proportionate to scope of disclosure is always appropriate for eco-
nomically valuable advances.  Consider, for example, a new kind 
of “poison pill” defense to corporate takeovers, a new style of at-
tention-getting sales pitch, a new means of alleviating certain neu-
roses by novel and unobvious psychoanalytic techniques, a new fu-
tures contract providing a hedge against a different kind of market-
affecting factor, and a new investment product (i.e., security) based 
on combining and collateralizing accounts receivable, and a new 
tax shelter expedient.  Assume that these “inventions” need use of 
no special machinery; hence, they readily can be explained exhaus-
tively for purposes of enablement.  Nonetheless, would any patent 
on these presumably useful and economically valuable social con-
tributions be appropriate?  If not, there may be intractable prob-
lems with patents and copyrights for some kinds of methods of do-
ing business.  Should it make any difference if these inventions are 
practiced by means of a computer and computer program?  Does 
that fact suffice to bring the invention within the patentable techno-
logical arts? 
Case law in the Federal Circuit on patenting methods of doing 
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business has taken a wrong turn, which copyright law has avoided.  
The State Street decision illustrates a shortcoming of patent law’s 
treatment of methods of doing business.12  Geared as it originally 
was to machinery and similar tangible embodiments of technology 
and applied arts, patent law failed to develop an effective limiting 
principle for abstract aspects of intangible innovations.  The law 
has either entirely cast them out of patent-eligibility as mere ab-
stract ideas or else, as in State Street, has let them into the patent 
system with no subject matter-related limitation at all.13  Features 
for titrating the scope of legal protection to degrees of abstractness 
and to public need for access to some elements of expression in or-
der to allow the expressions of other creators to be made available 
to the public have long been fixtures of copyright analysis, as the 
following review of intellectual property law history in this field 
demonstrates.  The interests of the public might be better served if 
copyright law’s rules were extended to patent law. 
This paper attempts to develop a conceptual framework for en-
riching patent law’s approach to methods of doing business by in-
corporating some features of copyright law analysis. 
I.  CASE LAW ON COPYRIGHTS AND PATENTS ON METHODS  
OF DOING BUSINESS 
A.  Copyrighting Methods of Doing Business 
The first, greatest, and most familiar reported decision on 
copyrighting methods of doing business is Baker v. Selden.14  This 
decision set the stage for everything that has come since.  Charles 
Selden devised a peculiar, presumably novel, and quite useful 
method of double-entry bookkeeping.15  Selden published a book, 
Selden’s Condensed Ledger, explaining his bookkeeping system.  
The book included blank forms for practicing the system.  Baker 
published a variation on these forms, but they were adapted for 
carrying out the same bookkeeping system.  Accordingly, if the 
 
12. 149 F.3d  at 1373-77. 
13. Id. at 1377. 
14. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
15. Selden’s system, by a peculiar arrangement of columns and headings, presented 
the entire operation of a day’s, week’s, or month’s business on a single page or two facing 
pages.  Id. at 100. 
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copyright in the book protected Selden’s system, then Baker was 
an infringer.16 
The Court held that a copyright in a book did not protect the 
teachings of the book.  The copyright protected the author’s own 
verbal explanation of the teachings, but it did not prevent others 
from teaching the same concept in different words or other expres-
sions of their own.17  The copyright in the book did not protect the 
system that the book described because “there is a clear distinction 
between the book, as such, and the art which it is intended to illus-
trate.”18  That is to say, when x≠y, a copyright on x is not a copy-
right on y and therefore does not protect y against infringement.  
As for y, the art illustrated, the Court said that copyright could not 
protect that at all.  Copyright law operates by mere registration, not 
examination of novelty by technical experts as in the case of pat-
ents.  Protecting the art described in a book “is the province of let-
ters-patent, not of copyright.”19  Granting an exclusive right to an 
art or system without prior screening in the Patent Office “would 
be a surprise and a fraud upon the public.”20  The Court added, 
“Whether the art might or might not have been patented is a ques-
tion which is not before us.”21 
With scant exception, that is where copyright law has stood 
ever since.22  Moreover, section 102(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act 
substantially adopts much of the language and concept of the Su-
 
16. See id. at 107. 
17. The Court said, “The use by another of the same methods of statement, whether in 
words or illustrations, in a book published for teaching the art, would undoubtedly be an 
infringement of the copyright.”  See id. at 104. 
18. See id. at 102. 
19. See id. 
20. See id. 
21. Id. at 104.  An 1869 decision of the Commissioner of Patents, Ex Parte Abraham, 
1869 C.D. 59, stated that “it is contrary to the spirit of the patent laws, as construed by the 
Office for many years, to grant patents for methods of book-keeping, to which the [claimed 
customs tax stamp and coupon] system in question is perfectly analogous.” 
22. For example, a book explaining a system of taking shorthand notes does not pro-
tect the copyright owner against another book explaining the same shorthand system and 
using similar symbols.  See Brief English Sys. v. Owen, 48 F.2d 555 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
283 U.S. 858 (1931).  More recently, a set of commands for designating spreadsheet func-
tions and syntax rules for combining them was held uncopyrightable.  Lotus Dev. Corp. v. 
Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 
233 (1995). 
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preme Court’s opinion in Baker v. Selden.23  Perhaps the closest 
that a copyright decision has come in recent years to addressing the 
protectability of a method of doing business is the district court 
opinion in Merritt Forbes & Co., Inc. v. Newman Investment Secu-
rities, Inc.24  Merritt Forbes, a securities underwriter, sued New-
man, another underwriter, for infringing copyright in a set of mu-
nicipal bond offering documents for Merritt Forbes’s Tender 
Option Program.  The program was a new and popular investment 
package that a creative bond lawyer, Horowitz, developed for Mer-
ritt Forbes.25  The special feature of the program was that it permit-
ted investors to “put” or “tender” a tax-exempt bond back to the is-
suer prior to the bond’s maturity date.26  The program was 
described in several documents drafted to satisfy securities law re-
quirements for such offerings.  Within six months after Merritt 
Forbes began promoting the Tender Option Program, Newman be-
gan to offer its version of the program, Tender Option Securities, 
using offerings documents substantially similar to Merritt Forbes’s 
copyrighted documents.27  Merritt Forbes sued and Newman 
moved for summary judgment on the ground that copyright could 
not protect against competitive use of a securities offerings pack-
age.28 
The district court held the legal documents copyrightable, in 
principle, just as any other literary creation is.29  The question was 
the extent to which, or circumstances in which, the copyright ex-
tended to prevent the defendant’s conduct, given the nature of the 
underlying literary work.  Newman argued that bond underwriting 
documents were not a proper subject for copyright protection, for 
several reasons.  Newman’s experts stated that bond offerings 
documentation is prepared by marking up preexisting documenta-
tion to reflect the substantive differences that occur in a new bond 
 
23. 101 U.S. 99 (1879); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994), See infra note 124 and accompa-
nying text. 
24. 604 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
25. Id. at 947. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 947-48. 
28. Id. at 948. 
29. Id. at 949-50. 
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package.30  The markup practice reflects the need to comply with 
securities law requirements and precedents upholding or prohibit-
ing use of particular language.  Much “boilerplate” language is 
therefore common to different underwriters’ documentation of 
similar offerings.  In addition, the use of boilerplate and other 
standardized language is functional for investors, because it per-
mits them to focus on the substantive differences between offer-
ings, ignore common features, and make a meaningful comparison 
of competing offerings.31  Newman argued that to let Merritt 
Forbes enforce a copyright on bond underwriting documents would 
preempt other underwriters from offering similar, competitive in-
vestment packages.32  This would be to the detriment of the invest-
ing public and would threaten the efficient operation of the bond 
market. 
The court denied summary judgment.  It recognized that public 
policy considerations and the doctrine of fair use may affect the 
degree to which courts protect a copyrighted work against other-
wise infringing conduct.33  Conceivably, therefore, Newman’s in-
fringement might be justified on policy or fair-use grounds.  But 
that issue was not before the court, as it perceived Newman’s 
summary judgment motion.34  It saw the summary judgment mo-
tion as a facial challenge to copyrightability of any and all bond 
documents rather than a factually based fair-use challenge. 
The court also rejected Newman’s generic claims about how 
bond documents are written.35  The court said that Newman’s ex-
perts testified about how bond documents generally are, and must 
be, written, but they did not substantiate that claim with specific 
evidence and illustrative examples.36  Nor did they provide a de-
tailed analysis of Newman’s accused documents, showing how 
their concept could be expressed only in a limited number of ways.  
Furthermore, the author Horowitz testified that because the Tender 
 
30. See Merrit Forbes, 604 F. Supp. at 945. 
31. Id. at 951-55. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 950. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 952-53. 
36. Id. 
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Option Program was a new investment package, he could not rely 
on document precedents and was obliged to create new material.37  
Accordingly, genuine issues of material fact precluded summary 
judgment.  The court noted that Newman’s claims “may well turn 
out to be accurate,” and that perhaps no legally adequate bond 
documentation can ever be original and other than functionally dic-
tated.38  But the court could not resolve that by summary judgment. 
Although the Merritt Forbes opinion is inconclusive as to the 
merits of the particular claim asserted in that case, it is nonetheless 
a suggestive illustration of how copyright law will treat claims to 
exclusive use of a business method by assertion of a claim of copy-
right in the underlying documentation.  If the form of the docu-
ments is dictated by functional considerations, the merger doctrine 
will limit protection.  Absent such merger, original documentation 
will probably be protected.  But the protection accorded will be of 
the particular literary expression in the documents, not the method 
of doing business underlying the documentation.  Moreover, the 
outcome will turn on a specific evidentiary showing rather than 
any abstract statement about general fact patterns seen in the indus-
try. 
B.  Patenting Methods of Doing Business 
Patent law early recognized the difference between ideas and 
embodiments of ideas into tangible products.  The 19th century de-
cisions in O’Reilly v. Morse39 and Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. How-
ard40 illustrate the principle, although not in the specific factual 
context of business methods. 
The Morse case involved Morse’s invention of the telegraph.  
Morse’s telegraph overcame the problem of earlier devices that 
noise engulfed signal after a distance of about ten miles.  To over-
come the problem, Morse devised a number of expedients, includ-
ing the well known Morse Code in which S-O-S is represented by 
three dots, three dashes, and three dots.  Perhaps the most impor-
tant of these expedients was Morse’s “repeater circuit.” The “re-
 
37. Id. at 952. 
38. See id. 
39. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853). 
40. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498 (1874). 
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peater circuit” was a cascade of battery and relay circuits, in which 
the output current of each relay circuit operated the relay coil of 
the next circuit, causing its battery to provide current for the next 
relay down the line, and so on for any desired distance.  By placing 
the relays no more than ten miles apart, Morse repeatedly elevated 
the signal above the noise level before noise engulfed the signal.  
Morse claimed these technical expedients in his claims 1-7, but in 
his claim 8 he more generally claimed the use of electromagnet-
ism, “however developed, for marking or printing intelligible char-
acters, signs, or letters, at any distances.”41 
The Supreme Court upheld claims 1-7 but invalidated claim 8 
as excessive.42  The Morse decision may be interpreted as a ruling 
that a claim is invalid if it purports to monopolize products or pro-
cesses that the specification of the patent does not teach the public 
to make and use.43  Morse may alternatively be understood as a 
ruling that at a certain level of preemptive abstraction for example, 
use of electromagnetism for telecommunications a patent claim is 
no longer directed to the kind of process or product that the patent 
system should protect.  The first reading looks to the specification 
to determine what it teaches.  The second reading of Morse exam-
ines the ontological texture of the claim and rejects unduly abstract 
subject matter.  The second formulation of the doctrine of the 
Morse case asks such questions as: Is it a geometry theorem?  Is it 
a method of doing arithmetic?  Is it an equation or formula, as 
such?  Is it a law of nature?  Is it a natural principle?  Is it a method 
of doing business? 
In The Rubber-Tip Pencil Case,44 the Court held unpatentable 
the combination of a pencil and a rubber eraser with a hole in it 
into which the pencil fitted.  The implementation of the idea of a 
pencil and eraser handily associated together45 seemed so simple 
and followed so readily from the idea that the Court considered, in 
effect, that idea and embodiment merged.  The Court therefore 
 
41. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 91. 
42. Id. at 124 
43. Claim 8 covers fax machines and television sets, for example, although Morse’s 
specification does not describe and enable them. 
44. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498 (1874). 
45. Or the idea that rubber sticks to wood when you make a tight fit between them. 
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stated that the case was governed by the principle that “[a]n idea of 
itself is not patentable, but a new device by which it may be made 
practically useful is.”46  Under this test the patent was invalid. 
Application of the principles of Morse and Rubber-Tip to pat-
enting methods of doing business did not begin in earnest until 
around the beginning of the 20th century.  This history is traced in 
other contributions to this Symposium and need not be rehearsed in 
detail here.  Although commentary47 and general statements in case 
law were common (indeed, universal) that methods of doing busi-
ness were not patentable, there was hardly any explanation, apart 
from precedent, why that should be so.48  The writer is aware of 
 
46. Id. at 507; accord LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 155, 174-75 (1852).  
Jefferson expressed a similar idea in his 1807 letter to Oliver Evans, when he said that he 
could not conceive of “how a principle abstracted from a machine” could be patentable.  
See 11 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 201 (Mem’l Ed. and Lispscomb & Bergh eds. 
1903); 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75 (Washington ed.).  Curiously, Oliver Evans 
shortly after that brought a patent infringement suit on his patent (issued in 1808 by Jef-
ferson), and the circuit court charged the jury that “a mere abstract principle cannot be 
appropriated by patent.”  See Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 475 (1818). 
 Jefferson’s statement goes beyond the degree of concreteness that the Supreme Court 
has required.  Reduction or transformation of one substance to another, without limitation to 
specific machinery, is patentable as a process.  See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69-
71 (1972).  The Federal Circuit subsequently extended patentable processes to transforma-
tions of “subject matter,” including transformations of signals representative of physical 
parameters (e.g., temperature) to other signals.  See In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 
1994).  State Street has now further expanded that concept to include the transformation of a 
first set of financial data to a second set of financial data.  149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
47. See, e.g., Robert I. Coulter, The Field of the Statutory Useful Arts, Part I, 34 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 417, 418 (1952) (technological arts, or “useful arts,” do not 
include business, teaching, and politics); Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 393, 393-94 (1960) (explaining that § 101 limits patentability to technologi-
cal subject matter, so that “one of the greatest inventions of our time, the diaper service” is 
outside § 101 despite its usefulness).  Other authorities are collected in Leo J. Raskind, The 
State Street Decision: Economic Foundation and Antitrust Implications, 10 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 61, n.2 (1999).  See also Claus D. Melarti, State Street 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc.: Ought the Mathematical Algorithm and 
Business Method Exceptions Return to Business As Usual?, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 359, 362-
65 (1999) (collecting commentary and cases, and asserting that “the business methods ex-
ception had become ‘hornbook’ law cast in stone”). 
48. Even the amicus curiae brief submitted by VISA and Mastercard to the Federal 
Circuit in State Street did not attempt to explain what adverse business or social conse-
quences, if any, would result from patents on methods of doing business.  Their brief ex-
plained that as financial services institutions they were concerned about the possible “far-
reaching implications in the financial services industry” of the decision (Brief at 1, State 
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only two discussions in any detail of why patents on methods of 
doing business, as such, should not issue.  One is the 1950 decision 
of the District of Columbia Circuit in Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. 
Marzall.49  The other is the government’s Supreme Court briefs in 
Dann v. Johnston.50 
In the Seagram case, an alcoholic beverage manufacturer 
sought a patent on “blind testing” consumer beverage preferences 
as a way to determine what blends would be likely to sell best.51  
The Patent Office denied a patent on the ground that methods of 
doing business were unpatentable.  The court of appeals affirmed 
the Office, stating that such a patent would be “a serious restraint 
upon the advance of science and industry.”52  The court did not ex-
pand more fully on this terse observation. 
Johnston appears to be the only time that the issue of patenting 
a method of doing business came before the Supreme Court.53  
Johnston had devised a system of permitting banks to offer their 
customers monthly and annual subtotals for different categories of 
checks such as tax payments, fuel purchases, rent, or charitable 
contributions “by associating an additional numerical field with the 
numerical codes already on a check for account numbers and the 
like.54  The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed the Pat-
ent Office’s rejection; the Supreme Court granted certiorari as to 
questions of patentability of the subject matter and also obvious-
ness. 
The government argued that the principle against patenting ab-
stract intellectual concepts applied equally to business ideas “be-
cause patents on methods of transacting business would destroy le-
gitimate competition, just as patents on scientific ideas would 
 
Street (96-1327)), but their arguments were couched entirely in terms of legal doctrine.  The 
farthest they went, in this direction, was to complain that business innovations “would be-
come fair game for opportunistic patent applicants” if the court upheld the patent in suit.  
Brief at 19. 
49. 180 F.2d 26 (D.C. Cir. 1950). 
50. 425 U.S. 219 (1976). 
51. Seagram, 180 F.2d at 27. 
52. Id. at 28. 
53. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219. 
54. Id. at 221. 
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impede scientific progress,” citing the Seagram case.55  The gov-
ernment also invoked the Morse case for the principle that a busi-
ness idea could not be patented apart from its embodiment in a 
novel apparatus or process.56  Finally, the government argued that 
the business idea of providing customers with subtotal or sub-
account information was so readily implemented, once one was in 
possession of the unpatentable idea, that no invention was involved 
that satisfied the statutory requirements of patentability.57 
The Johnston Court did not pass upon the patentability of busi-
ness methods.  It simply held that the claimed subject matter was 
obvious, because the gap between the prior art and the claimed in-
vention was too slight to warrant issuance of a patent.58 
C.  The State Street Decision 
Against this background, in 1998 the Federal Circuit’s State 
Street decision gave the rule against patenting methods of doing 
business what seems to be its coup de grace.59  Independent of 
claim 1, the patent was directed to a data processing system for 
managing a partnership of pooled funds in accordance with certain 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and implementing regula-
tions.  Ordinarily a pool of this type will be deemed a taxable en-
 
55. Brief for the Petitioner at 21, Johnston (74-1033). 
56. Id. at 22.  A 1949 First Circuit opinion had made this point, using the Automat 
coin-operated cafeteria as an illustration.  See Loew’s Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In 
Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547, 552 (1st Cir. 1949).  The court’s opinion suggests that the idea 
of a coin-operated cafeteria was not patentable, but a specific coin-operated food-dispensing 
machine, such as that used in Horn & Hardart’s Automat cafeterias, could be patented.  In 
other parts of its brief, the government argued that the claimed invention involved no new 
apparatus, but simply was, at best, a conventionally implemented new use of an old com-
puter.  Brief for the Petitioner at 22, Johnson (74-1033). 
57. Petitioner’s Brief at 22-24; Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 11-12 (“In the present 
case, all we have is respondent’s recognition that it might be profitable for banks to add, as 
an adjunct to their existing checking account business, the service of classifying checks and 
deposit slips into specified categories, plus respondent’s devising conventional means of 
implementing this idea.”). 
58. 425 U.S. at 230.  The Court’s failure to pass on the issue of nonstatutory subject 
matter (i.e., patent eligibility) may be attributed to an excess of partisan zeal and thus tacti-
cal error on the part of government counsel: the present writer.  The factual portion of the 
government’s brief so vigorously denigrated the merits of the supposed invention, as a “sof-
tening up” technique before reaching statutory subject matter issues, that the Court never 
reached the latter.  See Stern, supra note 2 at 498 and n.15. 
59. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375. 
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tity, so that it pays a corporate income tax on its profits and the ul-
timate taxpayers may also pay personal income tax on their divi-
dends ultimately derived from the entity.  However, when the 
pool’s profits, losses, and expenses are allocated on a daily basis in 
accordance with IRS regulations, the pool is not taxed as an entity 
and its untaxed profits flow through to its members (the individual 
funds).  The effect is that income taxation occurs only once, if at 
all, at the ultimate taxpayer level of distribution.60  An incidental 
benefit may be economies of scale in administering the constituent 
funds on an integrated basis. 
Claim 1 recited a supposed61 combination of a general-purpose 
digital computer having a CPU, a data storage memory, and five 
means for performing various functions.  The recited functions cor-
respond to the requirements of the IRS regulations and underlying 
statutory provision, when carried out by means of instructions of a 
computer program.62  In substance, therefore, we have statute and 
regulations to the effect that to obtain a single level of taxation 
(pass through of income) rather than suffer double taxation, a & b 
& c & d & e must be done.  As a practical matter, since the Internal 
Revenue Code and its regulations require these accounting func-
tions to be performed daily between the close of the market and 
 
60. 26 U.S.C. § 706(d) (1994); IRS Reg. § § 1.704-1(b), 1.704-1(f) (1997).  See infra 
Appendix A.  In this system, it is contemplated that the funds (the so-called spokes) will be 
tax-free municipal bond funds, thereby avoiding taxes.  The pool is termed the “hub,” and 
hence the investment product goes by the name “Hub and Spokes.”  Curiously, Boes, the 
named inventor in the patent, was not the originator of the “Hub and Spokes” package, but 
was instead just the programmer or systems analyst.  That raises the interesting question of 
who is the inventor in a business-method case: is it the programmer or systems analyst who 
designs the program to implement the method or is it the MBA who had the underlying idea 
of the financial product or business model?  As the Federal Circuit has pointed out, in the 
context of enablement, the task of programming may on occasion require substantial effort 
but often it is a routine, clerical task for a skilled programmer, requiring only ordinary ef-
fort.  See Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990); see also In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
61. I say “supposed” because the separate means-plus-function clauses of the claim 
are simply recited seriatim without any words coupling the elements of the claim to one an-
other in the once-requisite “knee bone connected to the thigh bone, thigh bone connected to 
the hip bone” formulation, which distinguishes a combination from an aggregation of unre-
lated parts that do not cooperate with one another. 
62. See infra Appendix A. 
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midnight, the functions must be performed with a computer.63  The 
patent claims the combination of means for performing a, means 
for performing b, . . . and means for performing e.  In other words, 
the patent claims means for complying with tax law as to pooling 
funds.  Accordingly, the district court found that the effect of claim 
1 was “to foreclose virtually any computer-implemented account-
ing method necessary to manage this type of financial structure 
[pooled fund partnership].”64  The district court then concluded: 
“patenting an accounting system necessary to carry on a certain type 
of business is tantamount to a patent on the business itself.  Because 
such abstract ideas are not patentable, either when regarded as 
methods of doing business or as mathematical algorithms, the ‘056 
patent must fail.”65 
The Federal Circuit reversed on both of the grounds upon 
which the district court supported its conclusions.66  As to the algo-
rithm ground, the Federal Circuit held that claim 1 did not claim an 
abstract idea.67  Although claim 1 was directed to a series of arith-
metic calculations, the rule against patenting arithmetic calcula-
tions did not apply because here the calculations constituted a prac-
tical application of an algorithm.  The reason was that the 
calculations produced “a useful, concrete and tangible result” 
namely a price figure “accepted and relied upon for regulatory 
purposes and other business purposes” as well (trading in the mar-
ket).68  The mere fact that claim 1 claimed a calculation did not 
make it unpatentable, even though “[u]nder Benson,69 this may 
have been a sufficient indicium of nonstatutory70 subject matter.”71  
 
63. Signature also contended that NASDAQ requirements for mutual funds offered to 
the public require daily share value calculations to be made within an hour and a half after 
the market closes (4 PM EST).  Brief for Appellant at 4 n.3, State Street Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502, 504 (D. Mass. 1995) (94-11344-PBS). 
64.  State Street, 927 F. Supp. at 516.  In addition, the patentee asserted to alleged in-
fringers that it was not possible to manage a fund pool in accordance with IRS regulations 
without infringing the patent. 
65. Id. 
66. State Street, 149 F.3d  at 1373-77. 
67. Id. at 1376. 
68. Id. at 1373. 
69. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
70. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). 
71. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1374. 
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The Federal Circuit said that Benson’s legal rule no longer applied 
“[h]owever, after Diehr72 and Alappat73 the mere fact that a claimed 
invention involves inputting numbers, calculating numbers, output-
ting numbers, and storing numbers, in and of itself, would not render 
it nonstatutory subject matter, unless, of course, its operation does 
not produce a ‘useful, concrete and tangible result.’”74 
Decrypted, this passage states that under the Supreme Court’s 
Gottschalk v. Benson opinion claim 1 would have been unpat-
entable under section 101, but after the Supreme Court’s Diamond 
v. Diehr75 opinion and the Federal Circuit’s In re Alappat en banc 
opinion76 claim 1 must be held to embody patentable subject mat-
ter, since the later decisions overruled or superseded Benson.77  
Curiously, the Supreme Court’s Diehr opinion does not state that 
its Benson opinion is overruled or limited.78  Rather, Diehr pur-
ports to follow Benson and explains that its holding is in harmony 
with the rule declared in Benson.79  The State Street opinion there-
fore finds the Supreme Court’s Benson decision no longer an au-
thoritative precedent entirely on the basis of the Federal Circuit’s 
own Alappat opinion.  Even that is problematical, for the Federal 
Circuit’s opinion in Alappat does not state that Benson has been 
superseded by later authority.80  To the contrary, the Alappat opin-
ion cites Benson several times for propositions forming part of the 
court’s rationale in Alappat.81  One might thus regard State Street 
as a remarkable treatment of precedent. 
The Federal Circuit then turned to the business method rule: 
 
72. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192-93 (1981). 
73. In re Alappat,, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
74. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1374. 
75. Diehr, 450 U.S.  at 192-3 
76. Benson, 409 U.S. 63. 
77. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1526. 
78. See  Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192-3 
79. Id. at 185-87, 191.  Furthermore, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), a 
Supreme Court decision approximately contemporaneous with Diehr, stated that a “claim 
for an improved method of calculation . . . is unpatentable subject matter under § 101.”  Id. 
at 314 (quoting Parker v. Flook 437 U.S. 584, 595 n.18. (1978)).  That is what Benson held 
when it determined that a method of converting binary-coded decimal numerals to binary 
numerals was unpatentable subject matter under § 101.  Benson, 409 U.S. at 64. 
80. Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526. 
81. See id. at 1542-45. 
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“We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception [to 
patentability] to rest.”82  The court laid the business methods rule 
to rest by ignoring commentary and dismissing case law by finding 
all of it either obiter dicta or decided on grounds other than the 
business methods rule, for example, on obviousness grounds.  If 
nothing else, the prior case law in the main preceded enactment of 
the 1952 recodification of the patent code, so that the case law 
could be disregarded on that basis alone.83 
It had been argued that Alappat had acknowledged the rule 
against patents on methods of doing business.  For example, Alap-
pat stated at one point that an earlier decision, In re Maucorps,84 
was distinguishable for several reasons and therefore could be dis-
regarded as a precedent pointing to a result opposite to that reached 
in Alappat.85  One of the distinctions stated was that “Maucorps 
dealt with a business methodology for deciding how salesmen 
should best handle respective customers,”86 and clearly such an 
“invention” did not come within the patent code’s definition of 
patentable subject matter.87  But this language could also be disre-
garded, the State Street panel said.  The reason was that “closer 
scrutiny . . . reveals that the claimed inventions . . . were rejected 
as abstract ideas under the mathematical algorithm exception, not 
 
82. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375. 
83. An exception, unmentioned in the State Street opinion, was the Federal Circuit’s 
earlier panel opinion, In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).  In Grams the court held 
that a system for diagnosing abnormalities in a patient by comparing subsets of clinical pa-
rameters in order to isolate subsets having an abnormal relation was unpatentable as essen-
tially a claim to a mathematical algorithm. Id. at 841.  By so ruling, the court extended the 
rule to include algorithms expressed in words (here, set theory language) rather than by an 
alphanumeric formula or equation.  In commenting on the unpatentability of mathematical 
algorithms, the court stated, “Thus, mathematical algorithms join the list of non-patentable 
subject matter not within the scope of section 101, including methods of doing business, 
naturally occurring phenomenon [sic], and laws of nature.”  Id. at 837; 35 U.S.C. § 101 
(1994).  However, the court expressly noted elsewhere that because of its ruling on algo-
rithms it was not addressing the PTO’s alternate holding of unpatentability based on the 
claims being drawn to a method of doing business.  See id. at 840.  Grams was briefed to 
the Federal Circuit in the State Street case. 
84. 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1979). 
85. 33 F.3d at 1540-1541. 
86. Id. at 1541. 
87. Id.  In the Court’s language, “Clearly, neither of the alleged ‘inventions’ in those 
cases falls within any § 101 category.” Id. 
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the business method exception.”88  That is indeed so, but that is not 
what the Alappat opinion said about Maucorps.  It did not say that 
about Maucorps because it was necessary in Alappat to distinguish 
Maucorps, given the circumstance in Alappat of a fragmented en 
banc court with a very shaky one-vote majority for a judgment that 
came out on the opposite side of the Maucorps algorithm issue.89  
It seems fair to say that this, too, is a remarkable way to handle 
case law. 
As for the district court’s finding that claim 1 preempted 
pooled-fund partnerships satisfying the requirements of tax law, 
the Federal Circuit stated: “Assuming the above statement to be 
correct, it has nothing to do with whether what is claimed is statu-
tory subject matter.”90  That is a question to which this paper will 
return. 
In January 1999, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the 
 
88. 149 F.3d at 1376. 
89. In Alappat, an algorithm case, the en banc Federal Circuit distinguished Mau-
corps by saying that it was a business-method case.  Id. at 1541.  In State Street, a busi-
ness-method case (at least, for purposes of the pertinent part of the opinion), a panel of 
the Federal Circuit distinguished Maucorps by saying that it was an algorithm case.  See 
State Street, 149 F.3d at 1376.  Judge Rich spoke for the court in both cases.  Id. at 1368. 
 Eleven Federal Circuit judges participated in Alappat.  Two main issues were before 
the court.  The substantive merits issue was whether the claim was directed to nonstatutory 
subject matter, as the PTO’s administrative board had held.  The other issue was jurisdic-
tional.  Had the administrative board been properly constituted or was it stacked?  State 
Street, 33 F.3d at 1576 (Mayer, J., dissenting).  Four members of the court considered the 
board improperly constituted and therefore considered its order under review to be a nullity, 
so that appellate jurisdiction was lacking.  Seven members of the court, on various theories, 
determined that a true board decision was before the court, which was reviewable on its 
merits.  Of the seven, two considered the claim to be directed to nonstatutory subject matter 
and therefore would have affirmed the board’s order.  The remaining five out of eleven par-
ticipating judges considered the claim to be directed to statutory subject matter and there-
fore voted to reverse the board’s order.  In addition, one of the four judges who opined that 
the court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal joined (without comment) the merits opinion 
of the five judges who concluded that the claim was directed to statutory subject matter, so 
that six of the eleven agreed on the substantive point.  It is unclear, and the court did not 
address the matter, whether it would have been possible for the en banc court to render its 
judgment if all four of those dissenting on the jurisdictional issue had refused (as three did) 
to address the substantive merits, thereby providing only five out of eleven judges willing to 
vote that the claim was directed to statutory subject matter. 
90. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1377. 
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State Street case,91 leaving the Federal Circuit’s decision appar-
ently the law of the land.  Absent congressional action, which 
would seem most improbable, and absent the Supreme Court’s de-
ciding to review a final judgment of infringement liability in some 
future patent infringement case appropriately raising and preserv-
ing this issue,92 the books appear to be closed on the rule against 
patents on methods of doing business.  It is unlikely that any Fed-
eral Circuit panel will repudiate or seriously limit the State Street 
decision, although this paper will revisit that point briefly before 
concluding.  At any rate, in another panel’s April 1999 decision, 
AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., the Federal Circuit 
enthusiastically reaffirmed State Street and applied its approach to 
claims on a method for billing telephone calls at different rates de-
pending on whether a caller places a call to someone using the 
caller’s or a different long-distance carrier.93 
The result is, in the first instance, what the PTO’s Commis-
sioner has termed a boom in business-method patent applications 
and patents.94  At the same time, the financial community is enjoy-
ing the experience of future shock as it learns to its surprise about 
patents.95 The State Street decision is little help to any of those af-
fected by the boom, because its legal analysis is so cursory that its 
patentability standard is little better than Justice Stewart’s test for 
recognizing hard core pornography.96  Small wonder that State 
Street has been received with what the Commissioner has termed a 
“hysterical reaction.”97 
 
91. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc. 119 S.Ct. 851 (1999). 
92. For a further comment on this point, see infra notes 161-168 and accompanying 
text. 
93. 172 F.3d 1352, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir.) cert. denied. 120 S.Ct. 368 (1999). 
94. See “Boom” in Business Method Patent Filings Has Followed “State Street” Rul-
ing, PTO Says, ELEC. COM. & LAW REP. (BNA) 1393 (Dec. 16, 1998). 
95. The House Report on H.R. 1907, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. (1999), comments: “The 
State Street decision has brought that industry [the financial services industry] abruptly to 
the foreground of cutting-edge patent law protection for subject matter that previously had 
been thought to be unpatentable.” 
96. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (stating “I know it when I see 
it”). 
97. See “Boom” in Business Method Patent Filings Has Followed State Street Rul-
ing, PTO Says, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPR. J. (BNA) 115 (Dec. 10, 1998).  Forbes Maga-
zine suggests that e-commerce magnates may “try to turn patents into the barbed wire of 
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II.  WHAT IS THE PROBLEM? 
A.  Useful vs. Liberal Arts 
At the outset of exploring why a problem is perceived with 
patents on methods of doing business, one possible explanation for 
perceiving that problem should be considered and promptly put 
aside.  This explanation is that business methods, like music and 
painting, are part of the liberal arts or the cultural arts rather than 
part of the “useful arts,” and are therefore inappropriate subjects of 
patents.  As a rationalizing principle this concept is about as help-
ful as would be the concept of the useless arts.  There is no way to 
reach agreement on what is a useful art and, even more important, 
on what is not a useful art.98 
 
the Internet.”  Josh McHugh, Barbed Wire on the Internet, FORBES, May 17, 1999, at 
183.  The American Banker asserts that the State Street decision “threatens to embroil the 
financial services industry in hundreds of patent infringement lawsuits,” creating possible 
liability exceeding $2 billion.  Jaret Seidberg, Ruling Threatens Banks With Patent Law-
suits, AM. BANKER, Sept. 2, 1998, at 3. 
 A story in IP Magazine warns that “a firestorm of litigation threatens to engulf cor-
porate America” and predicts “large-scale disruption of U.S. commerce, as sharp opera-
tors move to patent business methods and assert patents against the unsuspecting.”  Rob-
ert M. Kunstadt, Opening Pandora’s Box, IP MAG., Jan. 1999 (visited May 12, 1999) 
<http://www.ipmag.com/monthly/99-jan/kunstadt.html>.  Kunstadt predicts a replay of 
the controversy over patenting surgical procedures, which led to the Ganske Amendment, 
35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1994), preventing enforcement of such patents against medical prac-
titioners’ performance of medical activities: “That controversy will be re-enacted on a 
grand scale when corporate clients start to feel the effects of the giant trap for the unwary 
now set by the Federal Circuit. . . .”  Id. 
 Congress responded to this concern on November 19,1999 by enacting the First Inven-
tor Defense Act of 1999, adding a new section to the patent code to create a “first inventor 
defense” to a charge of patent infringement for prior commercial users of methods of doing 
business.  For an update on this controversial response, see Signing of IP Reforms Amends 
Work-for-Hire, Leaves ‘First Inventor Defense’ Unclear, 59 PAT., TRADEMARK & 
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 330, 331-32 (Dec. 2, 1999). 
98. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8, authorizes Congress “To promote Progress of Sci-
ence and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. . . .”  The term “useful arts” is 
a unitary concept.  It is no more definable, unless one begs the question, as the logical 
product of “useful” and “arts” than due process can be defined by taking the logical 
product of “due” and “process.”  “Arts,” as the term is used in the Constitution, is defi-
nitely not “processes,” the wisdom of the drafters of 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1994) to the 
contrary notwithstanding.  Substituting “processes” for “arts” in art. I, § 8, cl. 8 clearly 
leads to a nonsensical interpretation.  An art is a body of learning concerning a trade, or 
what was archaically termed a “mystery.”  See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-103 
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Some case law has attempted to resolve the definitional prob-
lem by defining the useful arts as those that involve application or 
utilization of technology, and thus equating the useful arts to the 
“technological arts.”99  But the concept of the technological arts is 
not a helpful tool to resolve this issue.  Using it just shifts the same 
analysis to a different level, and the same problems remain.  First 
of all, “technological arts” is not well defined, any more than “use-
ful arts” is.  Do we protect something because it is a technological 
or useful art, or is it a technological or useful art because we pro-
tect it?100 
 
(1879) (describing arts as techniques and distinguishing between property rights in writ-
ings explaining arts, such as watchmaking and plough-making, and property rights in arts 
as such).  The best modern synonym for the term “useful arts” that I can devise is “bodies 
of knowledge relating to the trades that artisans ply.” 
 It may be argued that the Constitution does not authorize Congress to bring business 
methods under the patent laws, but I do not think that the argument will prevail.  Rather, 
the question is what Congress must have intended in 1953 when it enacted 35 U.S.C. § 
101 (1994) by using words that have appeared in the corresponding provisions of the ear-
liest patent acts, and therefore must be taken as having the meaning accreted around them 
in the following 200 years of case law.  Resolving that question is less easy than posing 
it.  The Supreme Court has vacillated between conservative and expansive interpretations 
of the patent statute and its words of art.  The conservative line of authority has said that 
it is for Congress to expand the scope of these terms, if it so wishes, and not for the 
courts.  See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram 
Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).  The more expan-
sive view is reflected in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).  See also Dia-
mond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).  Since Diehr, no patent decision of the Court has 
illuminated its current attitude as to whether to interpret the patent law expansively or 
conservatively.  However, the decision in Feist Publications., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 
499 U.S. 340 (1991), construing the originality requirement of copyright law as preclud-
ing copyright protection of the mechanical results of “sweat of the brow,” is definitely 
more in the first camp than the second one.  Still, it should be recognized that the case is 
much stronger for regarding originality as implicit in the constitutional limitation of con-
gressional power to writings of authors than is the case for regarding business methods as 
outside the possible scope of discoveries (inventions) of artisans or workers in the useful 
arts. 
 This kind of inquiry is pedagogically entertaining but necessarily inconclusive.  Ac-
cordingly, this paper will not attempt to develop such an analysis.  The focus of this paper, 
instead, is how courts should analyze the permissible scope of business-method patents, 
based on an assumption that they are not per se outside the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
99. See, e.g., In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1003-04 (C.C.P.A. 1972)(Rich, J., con-
curring). 
100. See United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945)(addressing 
Professor Myres MacDougal’s famous question, “Do we protect it because it’s a property 
STERNFMTNOPIX.DOC 9/29/2006  3:27 PM 
1999] SCOPE OF PROTECTION PROBLEMS 129 
Second, any business method of any significance now needs to 
be carried out in part by means of a programmed computer.  Under 
the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence, as illustrated in State Street, 
that suffices to make the subject matter part of the technological 
arts.  The concept of the technological arts is now so inclusive that 
it amounts to a universal class,101 which makes it useless as a tool 
of legal analysis.102 
Seeking congressional intent as to what should be potentially 
patentable subject matter, and in particular whether business meth-
ods should, is equally useless.  On the one hand, the 1952 act was 
presented to Congress as a mere codification of existing law with-
out modification.103  In 1952, anyone asked would have assumed 
that business methods were in principle unpatentable, because that 
is what everyone had been saying for many decades.  On the other 
hand, there is the well known, but plainly inaccurate, statement in 
the legislative history that “anything under the sun that is made by 
man” is patentable.104  The intent of the founding fathers is even 
 
right, or is it a property right because we protect it?”).  Moreover, many arts well recognized 
as useful arts are not technological or are so “low tech” as not to deserve the designation of 
technological art.  Examples are the arts of the tanner, shoemaker, blacksmith, silversmith, 
swordsmith, cooper, baker, miller, brewer, dyer, weaver, hatter, tailor, saltmaker and horse-
breaker, all of which were useful, applied arts that were known, and practiced by artisans, at 
and prior to the time of adoption of the Constitution. 
101. Accordingly, the class of subject matter outside the technological arts, and there-
fore nonstatutory subject matter, amounts to a null class, an empty set. 
102. Professor Thomas, in his contribution to this Symposium, suggests adopting into 
our own patent statute European and Japanese patent law’s requirement of capability of in-
dustrial application.  See John R. Thomas, The Post Industrial Patent System, 10 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 1 (1999).  Perhaps, a sense that nonindustrial innovations 
are not the proper stuff of patent law accounts for some of the perception that business-
method patents should not be permitted.  Nevertheless, using industrial arts as a defining 
category may turn out to be as inconclusive as using the concept of technological arts. 
103. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 347 and 
n.2 (1961) (Black, J., concurring). 
104. See S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952) reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 
2399; H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952); see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 
309 and n.6 (1980).  Federal Circuit opinions have pointed out the incorrectness of this 
sweeping statement by showing examples to disprove it.  See In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 
1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 
1053, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (quoting the state-
ment made in Chakrabarty and then going on to acknowledge the existence of exceptions to 
the supposed general rule). 
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murkier. 
B.  Scope vs. Enablement 
One reason why a problem is perceived with patents on meth-
ods of doing business is the difficulty of properly titrating the 
scope of protection to enabling disclosure.  That is a real problem, 
but it is not insurmountable.  Patent law has addressed the scope 
problem in a variety of other contexts.  Despite the difficulties in 
analysis, acceptable results have been realized at least for the tradi-
tional subject matter of patent law.  For ordinary machines, com-
positions, articles of manufacture, and industrial processes, patent 
law has succeeded fairly well in distinguishing between unprotect-
able abstract ideas and protectable physical embodiments of ideas.  
There have been some difficulties and raw spots, but they certainly 
have not been calamitous and the accommodations reached are at 
least arguably satisfactory.  (The rough spots include “single 
means” claims,105 the controversy over who has the burden of 
proof as to scope of equivalency for a means-plus-function 
claim,106 and the controversy over whether the doctrine of equiva-
lents covers technology invented well after issuance of a patent.107) 
To be sure, patent law has had more difficulty in resolving 
scope problems in regard to computer-implemented inventions.  In 
the case of algorithms claimed as programmed general-purpose 
computers or as computer-readable storage media encoding algo-
rithms or computer programs, there has been a tendency in the 
PTO and Federal Circuit to accord patent protection to any com-
puter use of an algorithm, whether or not specifically enabled in 
 
105. See In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Rich, J.).  A single means claim 
alleges that all possible ways of accomplishing the claimed result or function.  Morse’s 
claim 8, presented a variation on this theme.  See supra text accompanying notes 39 - 41. 
Morse invented a particular telegraphic apparatus but broadly claimed the use of the motive 
power of electromagnetism, however developed, for telecommunications purposes. 
106. Compare In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc); and In re 
Bond, 910 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. 1990), which place the burden of showing equivalency with 
prior art devices on the Commissioner (i.e., PTO staff), with MPEP §§ 2183-84, which 
places the burden on the applicant to show non-equivalency once it appears to the examiner 
that the claimed and prior art devices perform the claim’s recited function. 
107. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 23-24 
(1997). 
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the specification of the patent claiming the use of the algorithm.108  
The current tendency in the Federal Circuit is to encourage broad 
claims to the use of an algorithm (i.e., programmed general-
purpose digital computer), where the algorithm is described as a 
series of means for performing a set of computations, divorced 
from any specific hardware context limiting the kinds of input or 
output.  The State Street opinion encourages that further, since it 
approves claims of the pure numbers-in, numbers-out kind, so long 
as any economically useful end use is mentioned in the specifica-
tion.109 
The problem is not that carrying out the steps of a claimed al-
gorithm invention is insufficiently enabled.  That is not so, for 
enabling the number-crunching core of an algorithm claim for one 
purpose is enablement for any purpose, typically, and most of the 
time any means of storage, adding, or other function that is equiva-
lent to any other means.  The problem is instead that, while the 
number-crunching core of the algorithm is enabled for any purpose 
to which the algorithm can be put, the input means and output 
means needed for applications (end uses) other than those de-
scribed in the specification may not be enabled, and yet the scope 
of the claims extends to any end use to which the algorithmic core 
can be put. 
While that is often a problem for claims to computer imple-
mentation of algorithms, it is not necessarily a problem (or as 
much of a problem) for methods of doing business.  In the State 
Street case, for example, independent claim 1 does not preempt 
anything but fund pooling partnerships.110  Claim 1 does not ex-
tend, for example, to selling stocks over the Internet, arbitraging or 
even to other tax avoidance schemes besides fund pooling partner-
ships.  The enablement is probably commensurate with the claim-
ing.  Suppose, instead, however, that the patentee in State Street 
had emulated Morse by claiming: 
 
108. Thus, one of the controversies in the Alappat case, dividing majority and dissent, 
was over whether the claims for smoothing “jaggies” (irregularities in other than horizontal 
or vertical lines) were limited to an oscilloscope context (enabled) or extended to other uses 
(not enabled), such as printing on paper.  In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
109. 149 F.3d 1368, 1373-1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
110. Id. at 1371-1372. 
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[A] system for avoiding multiple levels of taxation at entity 
and shareholder levels by use of [or, in modern, rather than 
Morse’s, patent parlance, said system comprising] a gen-
eral-purpose digital computer programmed with first means 
for complying with an IRC provision concerning whether 
income of an entity is taxable to the entity and second 
means for complying with IRS implementing regulations 
for said IRC provision.111 
Thus, whether enablement of full claim scope is a problem 
with business-method patents depends on the ambitiousness (or 
Napoleonic delusions) of the patentee and the particular business 
context.112 
C.  Preemption of Scènes à Faire 
The difference between the hypothetical claim (call it claim H) 
of the preceding paragraph and actual claim 1 in State Street113 is a 
matter of degree.  Instead of an all-inclusive “IRC provision” and 
its regulations, claim 1 essentially substituted “26 U.S.C. § 706(d)” 
and its regulations, at least insofar as pooled-funds partnerships are 
concerned.  As developed in more detail in Appendix A, and as the 
district court found and the Federal Circuit assumed,114 claim 1 
thoroughly foreclosed compliance with tax law requirements for 
avoiding multiple taxation of pooled fund partnerships.  It claimed, 
in substance, any “computerized system for complying with 26 
U.S.C. § 706(d)’s requirements for pooled-fund partnerships, 
where the system is any computer and any computer program car-
rying out this task.”115 
The difference between the hypothetical claim H and the pat-
entee’s actual claim 1, therefore, is one of claim scope.  Claim 1 is 
a species of genus claim H, just as Morse’s claims 1-7 were spe-
cies of his genus claim 8.  Surely claim H is objectionable per se.  
 
111. 149 F.3d 1368. 
112. For a recent example of extreme ambition, see Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. 
Compuserve Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q. 1797, 1998 WL 247485 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).  In that case, the 
patentee unsuccessfully urged a claim construction that would have made the patent extend 
to virtually any commerce transacted over the Internet. 
113. 149 F.3d at 1372-73. 
114. See supra text accompanying note 1. 
115. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1376-77; 26 U.S.C. § 706(d) (1994). 
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Despite the Federal Circuit’s lack of concern, claim 1 of the State 
Street116 case is objectionable, too, for preempting compliance with 
this portion of federal tax law.  The patent system was not intended 
to confer exclusive rights over compliance with any part of the In-
ternal Revenue Code.117  It is a perverse result, to say the least, to 
permit a patentee to command payment of a royalty (or in principle 
to have the right to an injunction against infringement118) where 
federal tax law imposes fines and imprisonment, or other penalties, 
on taxpayers who fail to comply with the requirements of federal 
tax law.119 
 
116. 149 F.3d at 1372-73. 
117. A comparable objection was raised to copyrighting judicial opinions in Wheaton 
v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834) (holding that the Court’s former reporter Wheaton 
could have no copyright in the text of Supreme Court opinions, and that the Court’s present 
reporter Peters was free to copy them from Wheaton’s Reports).  Moreover, works of the 
federal government, such as federal statutes, federal agency regulations, and congressional 
documents, are not subject to copyright protection.  See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1994). 
118. But see Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934) (deny-
ing on policy grounds injunction against municipality for infringing patent on sewage dis-
posal system).  Apparently, an injunction in this case would have resulted in extreme pollu-
tion of Lake Michigan by raw sewage, in the general vicinity of the court of appeals’s 
courthouse.  The principle may extend more generally, since courts “may” grant injunctions 
against patent infringement “in accordance with the principles of equity.”  35 U.S.C. § 282 
(1994). 
119. To be sure, in the State Street case the counter-argument may be made that 
taxpayers are not obliged to take advantage of the benefits of partnership fund pooling 
under 26 U.S.C. § 706(d) (1994).  They can either pay double taxes or eschew partner-
ship fund pooling. 
The argument, however, is questionable.  If this were a state law, rather than federal pat-
ent law, surely the state law would be preempted under the doctrine of such cases as Bar-
nett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 26 (1996) and Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 
(1941) (holding state law preempted if it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” in enacting a federal stat-
ute).  The statute here is federal, however, rather than state and therefore principles of 
supersession or statutory construction apply rather than those of preemption.  Nonethe-
less, the result should be the same.  As a matter of statutory construction, the intent of 
Congress is to extend the benefits of the tax law, in order to promote whatever policy 
Congress sought to effectuate by allowing a single level of taxation of partnerships, with-
out qualification and without permitting anyone to erect a toll booth across compliance 
with the Internal Revenue Code. 
 Furthermore, the facts of the State Street case do not limit the principle.  Even if 26 
U.S.C. § 706(d) (1994) is optional for taxpayers, much of the IRC is not.  A patent of this 
type could just as well apply to a mandatory provision of the IRC, with which taxpayers 
cannot avoid complying. 
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Furthermore, the problem is not limited to preempting compli-
ance with tax laws.  Compliance with many governmental regula-
tory schemes requires complex record-keeping or adherence to 
rules defined in terms of numerical parameters.  Compliance with 
SEC, FDA, or EPA regulations could therefore be as much the 
subject of a patent as pooling funds is.120  Moreover, there are 
quasi-governmental record-keeping requirements that also affect 
business and industry.  For example, generally accepted accounting 
principles (“GAAP”) pervasively affect compliance with state and 
federal securities and corporation laws.  How should we regard a 
patent on the combination of a computer, a memory, and comput-
erized means for complying with GAAP or with some aspect of 
GAAP? 
Revisiting the Merritt Forbes case reminds us of other exten-
sions of State Street.121  The Tender Option Program, or any other 
new securities product, could be an appropriate candidate for a 
patent after State Street.  There is a difference, however, between 
that kind of business-method patent and the kind suggested in the 
previous paragraph.  There are a multitude of conceivable securi-
ties products or investment packages.  Hence, “monopolization” of 
any one of them arguably means only that users can choose to pay 
the patentee for the use of the product or else they can do some-
thing different instead. 
On the other hand, there may be few or no available alternative 
choices when it comes to paying taxes, complying with FDA and 
EPA regulations, and following GAAP.  This suggests that the se-
verity of the business-patent problem may be simply a matter of 
delineating the “relevant market.”122  In antitrust law, the construct 
of relevant market defines the subject of legal scrutiny (specifi-
cally, the arena in which competition is alleged to have been 
 
120. A program named “Interdict PC” is currently advertised on the Web as a system 
for facilitating banks’ compliance with Office of Foreign Asset Control Regulations, 31 
C.F.R § 501.601 (1997). See < http://jmjconsulting.com/jmjcons2.htm>, (last visited Nov. 
19, 1999) Doubtless, a State Street type of claim could have been written that would have 
preempted compliance with these regulations by computer means. 
121. Merrit Forbes, 604 F. Supp. 943; State Street, 149 F.3d 1368. 
122. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481-
482 (1992); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391-97 (1956). 
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harmed) in an economically meaningful context.  Applying this 
concept to methods of doing business would require determining 
whether a method of doing business for which patent protection is 
sought is a meaningful arena of business competition or activity, or 
is just one of several approximately interchangeable species of a 
business genus.  Arguably, there is a problem, or at least a per-
ceived problem, with patents on methods of doing business when 
and only when the patents confer real economic power over a rele-
vant business market.  In short, the policy embodied in the Statute 
of Monopolies123 applies only to real monopolies.  Or does it? 
Copyright law may be suggestive.  Copyright law’s resistance 
to awarding exclusive franchises over ideas, systems, and abstrac-
tions is not limited to cases of true monopoly power.  Even under 
the merger doctrine, what is termed an art, idea or system need not 
be a relevant market for monopolization purposes.  Thus Selden’s 
copyright would not monopolize the entire art of bookkeeping; it 
would only monopolize the art or sub-art of keeping books in ac-
cordance with Selden’s particular system.  Of course, this may 
force us into controversies over “what is the art?” which is a rele-
vant market argument of sorts.124  In the area of literary works and 
comparable imaginative works, copyright law has developed idea 
and expression as a continuum.  Copyright law has also developed 
 
123. Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. I, ch. 3 (1623). 
124. Thus, some courts in applying the merger doctrine have found the idea in ques-
tion to be at such a high level of abstraction that almost unlimited opportunities exist for 
alternative expression.  This would be comparable to holding bookkeeping to be the art at 
stake in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), rather than bookkeeping in accordance with 
Selden’s particular system. See e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 
F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dism’d by stip., 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).  In that case, the court 
of appeals defined the idea of a compiler program, which was targeted at a particular micro-
processor chip (the 6502) and a particular programming language (Basic), as the idea of a 
compiler for any microprocessor chip and for any language.  This led the court to conclude 
that the merger doctrine did not apply, since many microprocessor chips and many pro-
gramming languages exist.  Id. at 1253.  Of course, users of Apple computers, which util-
ized a 6502 microprocessor chip and Basic language programs, had no need or ability to 
compile code for other microprocessor chips and other languages.  Apple’s concept of the 
relevant market for idea/expression purposes is not only inconsistent with Baker v. Selden, 
101 U.S. at 102, but it is inconsistent, as well, with the Supreme Court’s recent approach to 
relevant market in Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 463 (ruling that the possible relevant market 
was replacement parts for Kodak’s proprietary imaging machines — in effect, a brand-
defined aftermarket).  See Apple, 714 F.2d at 1252-54. 
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the expedient of treating this issue as a question of scope of protec-
tion against infringement, which copyright measures in analog or 
fuzzy logic terms, rather than as a matter of copyright-eligibility or 
not, measured in 1/0 digital terms.125  To be sure, copyright law 
has not developed the merger doctrine in quite the same way for 
systems, procedures, processes, and methods of operation as it has 
for ideas.126  For these categories of subject matter, the all-or-
nothing approach suggested in Baker v. Selden, and used in patent 
law to address statutory subject matter and nonstatutory subject 
matter, seems instead to have held sway.  Thus, if some aspect of a 
computer program is considered a system “for example, the syntax 
and vocabulary of its commands” that aspect of the computer pro-
gram will be held entirely ineligible for copyright protection.127  
Nonetheless, copyright law’s treatment of merger of idea and ex-
pression points to a more nuanced approach to eligibility for intel-
lectual property protection. 
Moreover, copyright law has an additional conceptual tool for 
dealing with abstractions and higher-level generalities for copy-
rightable works.  Copyright law has a doctrine akin to the merger 
doctrine, “the doctrine of scènes à faire.”  This doctrine recognizes 
 
125. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
126. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994), which uses this terminology.  That provision of 
the Copyright Act declares that copyright protection does not extend to “any idea, proce-
dure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.” Id. 
127. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d 
by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).  In Borland the First Circuit held the 
“command structure” of the spreadsheet program Lotus 1-2-3 to be a method of operation 
and therefore entirely ineligible for copyright protection.  Id. at 815.  The command 
structure was the set of keystrokes, and syntax rules for combining them, that a user em-
ploys to cause a spreadsheet to perform its functions.  Thus, for Lotus 1-2-3 the key-
strokes “/ F R” cause execution of the retrieve-a-file command.  The syntax rules define 
the ways to combine keystrokes.  Thus “/ F R” has a different meaning, and thus different 
effect, from “/ R F” as a command.  (Similarly, “the dog bit the man” and “the man bit 
the dog” have different meanings.) 
 In Borland Judge Boudin suggested the possible benefits of substituting a “more nu-
anced” treatment for the all-or-nothing approach of determining whether the command 
structure was a system. Id. at 819-22 (Boudin, J., concurring).  The more nuanced approach 
would accord copyrightability to the command structure and then use the doctrine of fair 
use, see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994), to temper scope of protection.  49 F.3d at 821.  He none-
theless concurred in the majority’s absolute approach because of the significant administra-
tive costs associated with the more nuanced approach.  Id. at 822. 
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that certain genres require certain elements, or at least almost al-
ways utilize them.  Without these stock elements, those to whom 
the work is directed may fail to receive cues or may have their ex-
pectations disappointed.  Can a movie featuring Nazi soldiers as 
part of the action, as in Casablanca, fail to have them at some 
point sing Deutschland Über Alles?  Can a film with a saloon in 
the Old West lack a madam or prostitute with a heart of gold?  This 
doctrine has been extended to aspects of computer programs that 
necessarily result from hardware standards and mechanical specifi-
cations, software standards and compatibility requirements, com-
puter manufacturer design standards, programming practices, and 
practices and demands of an industry being served.128  These, too, 
are now part of scènes à faire.  Different courts differ on the extent 
to which setting must compel, or merely be likely to cause, use of 
the same elements in the original and accused work before scènes 
à faire applies.  Thus, in one case the Second Circuit said expan-
sively that a motion picture about the South Bronx would need to 
feature drunks, prostitutes, vermin, and derelict cars to be per-
ceived as realistic, and therefore these features were within the 
scènes à faire doctrine.129  The same court held that placing a dino-
 
128. Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1375 (10th Cir. 1997); Engineering 
Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 46 F.3d 408, 410 n.2 (5th Cir. 1995) (discuss-
ing Gates Rubber’s definition of scènes à faire); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. In-
dus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 838 (10th Cir. 1993).  The Mitel court suggested that scènes à faire 
and originality were alternative doctrines that could preclude copyright protection of fea-
tures of a work whose adoption was caused by such external factor or constraints.  Thus, 
even if the copyright owner could convince the court that the facts of the case fell outside 
the merger doctrine for some reason, nevertheless, scènes à faire or originality might re-
sult in a conclusion of no copyright infringement liability.  124 F.3d at 1373 n.6. 
 A similar observation is made in CMM Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc. 
where the court said that the two doctrines were similar in that they sought to prevent 
monopolization of ideas.  However, merger applied when idea and expression were in-
separable but scènes à faire applied where an external common setting (idea) caused use 
of common elements and thus similarity of expression. 97 F.3d 1504, 1522, n.25 (1st Cir. 
1996). 
 Trademark law has a similar limiting principle against protecting functional features of 
a work by trademarks.  See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co. Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 164-65, 
169 (1995).  However, the Supreme Court’s present concept of functionality in trademark 
law appears to go beyond scènes à faire to embrace any competitively significant feature 
even if the competitive significance is slight.  See id. 
129. Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 583 (2d Cir. 1996) (commenting on Walker 
v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986)). 
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saur zoo on an island far from the mainland was no more than 
scènes à faire in a dinosaur adventure story.130  Other courts may 
view the doctrine somewhat more narrowly.131 
Patent law, however, has no comparable doctrine.  Patent law 
has little in the way of limiting doctrines.  It particularly lacks ana-
log doctrines of scope limitation, as contrasted with digital, yes/no 
rules.  But perhaps copyright law may instruct patent law on this 
point, at least in the context of patenting methods of doing busi-
ness.  A governmental grant of the exclusive right to engage in a 
particular business may well be perceived as objectionable on pol-
icy grounds, even if the business does not amount to a relevant 
market for purposes of laws against monopolization.  Even the an-
titrust laws recognize restraints of trade132 and arrangements sub-
stantially lessening competition133 as problematic despite their fal-
ling short of full-blown monopolization.134 
Accordingly, the problem perceived with business-method pat-
ents may be perceived as more akin to that perceived with copy-
rights on scènes à faire than with monopolization of a relevant 
market or the problem occurring when idea merges with expres-
sion.  The rationale of the doctrine of scènes à faire is that exclu-
sivity over scènes à faire is a substantial impediment to the expres-
sions of other persons (and the public’s enjoyment of such 
expressions), even though the impediment is not a complete barri-
cade.  By the same token, little benefit to society (indeed, mainly 
or only detriment) is seen as flowing from grants of copyright ex-
clusivity over scènes à faire.  In a business and computer program 
context, the doctrine of scènes à faire and its policies have been 
 
130. Id. at 589. 
131. See Reyher v. Children’s Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(finding scènes à faire in “similarities of treatment, details, scenes, events and characteri-
zation”); cf Williams, 84 F.3d at 589 (basing scènes à faire on the total concept and 
feel.”). 
132. See Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). 
133. See Clayton Anti-Trust Act, ch. 323, § § 3,7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (1994). 
134. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768-69 
(1984); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Corp., 378 U.S. 158, 170-71 (1964); United 
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957).  Cf. FTC v. Sperry & 
Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1972)(extending concept of unfair acts and practices 
under section 5 of the FTC Act beyond incipient antitrust violations). 
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extended to practices and demands of an industry that the computer 
program serves, so that the concept of expression and scènes à 
faire are already defined or circumscribed in terms of business 
functionality.135  The resistance to copyright protection of business 
practices amounting to scènes à faire suggests why a similar prob-
lem is perceived with patents on methods of doing business. 
Do these copyright concepts appropriately translate to the do-
main of patent law?  That is a separate question from whether and 
why any problem is perceived with patenting business methods.  
That further question remains to be addressed.  But the doctrine of 
scènes à faire provides us with both reasons why a problem is per-
ceived with patenting business methods and why the perceived 
problem is not limited to those patents that confer a monopoly in 
the antitrust or economic sense of that term. 
III.  DOES PATENT LAW NEED A DOCTRINE LIKE SCÈNES À FAIRE? 
Whether scènes à faire translates appropriately to patent law 
has several aspects, and one can approach them separately in any 
order.  One issue is whether it would be better just to rest with the 
Federal Circuit panel’s treatment of business-method patents and 
forget about trying to address them in any special way because, on 
the merits, the Federal Circuit has it right.  Another issue is how, if 
one plans to adapt scènes à faire to the issue of patenting business 
methods, to go about doing so (and how feasible that is).  Another 
issue is whether patenting methods of doing business is really a 
section 101 issue (statutory subject matter) or more properly an is-
sue under other sections of the patent code, as the State Street 
opinion says it is.136  This paper addresses those issues in inverse 
order. 
The question, “Does patent law need a doctrine like scènes à 
faire?” means, first, asking whether patent law may not already 
have some other way to deal with the issue besides treating it as a 
 
135. See, e.g., Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 46 F.3d 408, 
410  n.2 (5th Cir. 1995).  Under this test, the tender option program of the Merritt Forbes 
case would be considered a business genre subject to scènes à faire, irrespective of whether 
it also qualified as merged, inseparable idea-expression under the merger doctrine.  Merrit 
Forbes and Co., Inc. v. Newman Inv. Sec. Inc., 604 F.Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
136. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373-75. 
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matter of lack of eligibility for patenting.  I will try to test that by 
using the business methods of the State Street and Merritt Forbes 
cases as test examples.137 
The State Street panel said that claim 1 was unobjectionable for 
section 101 patentability purposes, and proposed that any problems 
with claim 1’s patentability should be addressed under some other 
section of the patent code, such as section 112 or section 103.138  
Pursuing that route would probably be illusory.  If section 101’s 
limitations on patent eligibility do not filter out a business method, 
probably nothing else will. 
Section 112 has three possibly relevant requirements.  The 
specification of a patent (and patent application) must describe139 
and enable140 the invention, to the full extent of the claims, and the 
claims must particularly point out what the inventor regards as his 
invention.141  It is unlikely that any of these three requirements 
would effectively limit the preemptive scope of claim 1 of the 
State Street case (or would likely be successful in regard to a hypo-
thetical patent claiming the tender option program of the Merritt 
Forbes case).142  It cannot be said that the hub-and-spokes specifi-
cation fails to enable the described means for carrying out the in-
vention or that it fails to describe the preempted scope of claim 1.  
Nor is there any basis for believing that the patentee failed to re-
gard the claimed invention as preempting the field of complying 
with tax requirements for pooling fund partnerships and receiving 
the benefit of no more than a single level of taxation. Finally, it 
cannot be said that the claim is insufficiently definite in the ground 
that it fails the test that a person skilled in the art must be able to 
 
137. See id. at 1371-72; Merrit Forbes, 604 F.Supp. at 949. 
138. There is no room for application of 35 U.S.C. §102 (1994) here, because there is 
no art identically disclosing every element of claim 1.  See, e.g.,  Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigi-
tal Tech. Corp., 121 F.3d 1461, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  That is ordinarily true in any serious 
case of this kind, for the case would likely be disposed of at an early stage if true anticipa-
tion could be shown. 
139. See Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
140. See In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 909 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
141. See In re Conley, 490 F.2d 972, 976 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Miller, 441 F.2d 689, 
692 (C.C.P.A. 1971). 
142. State Street, 149 F.3d  at 1371-72; Merrit Forbes, 604 F. Supp at 947. 
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understand the reach of the claim.143 
Section 103’s theoretical ban on patenting the obvious is not 
likely to be of any help, either, although perhaps an argument 
could be crafted.  What the patentee did here was to combine the 
tax statute and regulations (or their substance) with the idea of us-
ing a computer to effectuate compliance with the statute and regu-
lations.144  The problem in State Street or any similar case would 
be to persuade the Federal Circuit that it is obvious to computerize 
the procedure. The Federal Circuit has made it extremely difficult, 
in recent years, for an accused infringer to prevail under a section 
103, obviousness defense.  First, the burden of proof is “clear and 
convincing evidence.”145  Second, because no single reference con-
tains all elements of the claimed combination, the accused in-
fringer must show that motivation existed in the art to combine the 
various elements into the claimed combination.146  Finally, the 
Federal Circuit rarely overturns a jury’s factual determinations 
supporting a conclusion of nonobviousness and juries strongly tend 
to favor patentees over accused infringers on validity issues. 
Thus, returning to State Street as an illustration, the accused in-
fringer may argue that it would be obvious to a person of ordinary 
skill, if confronted with the applicable provisions of the tax laws 
(set out in Appendix A) and desiring to computerize compliance 
with those laws for a pooled fund partnership, to write a program 
 
143. See Amgem, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co, 927 F.2d 1200, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(stating that test). 
144. Once one decides to computerize compliance with these provisions of tax law 
(which are set out in Appendix A), it requires no flash of inventive genius to carry out the 
routine programming that is needed.  The catch is the part of the preceding sentence that 
comes before the parenthesis. 
145. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Rockwell 
Int’l Corp. v. United States, 147 F.3d 1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
146. Before the PTO may combine the disclosures of two or more prior art references 
in order to establish prima facie obviousness, there must be some suggestion for doing so, 
found either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of 
ordinary skill in the art.  In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 998 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Chu, 66 
F.3d 292, 297 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG v. Hantscho Commercial 
Prods., Inc., 21 F.3d 1068, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“When the patented invention is made by 
combining known components to achieve a new system, the prior art must provide a sug-
gestion or motivation to make such a combination.”); In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 351 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992). 
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falling within the language of claim 1.  The Federal Circuit’s likely 
response to that argument is to state that it represents a “20-20 
hindsight” view, and to ask, “Where is the ex ante motivation to 
computerize those provisions of the tax laws?”  If it cannot be 
shown to be in the prior art, the Federal Circuit would continue, 
“Case closed, guilty as charged.”147 
A significant part of the perceived problem with business-
method patents is a sense that the subject matter is typically obvi-
ous but the patent system is now set up in a way that business-
method patents will not be adjudicated as obvious.  This may or 
may not be a misperception; perhaps the characterization is too 
sweeping.  In any event, it is very doubtful that sections 112 or 103 
are tools that could cope with the perceived problem with patenting 
business methods.148  That leaves it a matter of statutory subject 
matter under section 101 or nothing.149  Unless scènes à faire or 
something like it is understood as a part of section 101’s limitation 
on the kind of processes, machines, and so on that are eligible for 
patents, it is not likely that a substitute patent doctrine is available.  
That is unobjectionable, of course, if one believes that business 
methods should ordinarily be patented.  But whether they should is 
 
147. See Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 998.  For computer-related examples of this ap-
proach, see In re Zurko, 111 F.3d 887, 889-90 (Fed. Cir. 1997), reh’g en banc on other 
grounds, 142 F.3d 1447 (Fed. Cir.), rev’d on other grounds, _ U.S. _ , 119 S. Ct. 1816 
(1998); In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 917 (C.C.P.A. 1982).  For a criticism of the Federal 
Circuit’s approach in Zurko and that of its predecessor court and the similar approach of 
its predecessor court in Pardo, see John Kasdan, Obviousness and New Technologies, 10 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. ENT. & MEDIA L. J. 159 (1999).  See also Julie E. Cohen, Re-
verse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implica-
tions of “Lock-Out” Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1169-71, 1174-75 (1995) (ad-
vocating “innovative programmer” test for obviousness). 
 In the present writer’s view, it would be more sensible to adopt a rebuttable presump-
tion that a person of ordinary skill in any computer-using art would be motivated to com-
puterize any procedure that lent itself to computerization.  See Richard H. Stern, Tales From 
the Algorithm War: Benson to Iwahashi, It’s Deja Vu All Over Again, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 371, 
394-96 (1991).  Certainly, in the case of the financial industry, the securities industry, and 
any business involving accounting, which all use computers extensively, a person of ordi-
nary skill in the art will, if given the opportunity, computerize virtually any procedure that 
can be computerized efficiently.  The Federal Circuit’s presumption to the contrary is irra-
tional, at least in the factual context of computerization of business processes. 
148. 35 U.S.C. §§103, 112 (1994). 
149. 35 U.S.C. §§101 (1994). 
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not the issue that this portion of this paper addresses. 
IV.  HOW COULD PATENT LAW INCLUDE SCÈNES À FAIRE? 
If patent law dealing with methods of doing business would be 
improved by incorporation of a limiting doctrine such as scènes à 
faire, a threshold problem in adapting scènes à faire to patent law 
must be considered.  Copyright law’s preferred mode of addressing 
scope of protection as a function of creative contribution is to con-
cede copyrightability in principle to a work and then to adjust the 
scope of protection.  Fact works and compilations of preexisting 
material get “thin” protection while imaginative works, such as po-
ems and novels, get “thicker” or “fatter” protection.150  Elements of 
a work that are considered ideas or scènes à faire get little or no 
protection, while expressive elements get a great deal of protec-
tion.151  The doctrine of fair use may excuse or justify conduct that 
would otherwise cause copyright infringement liability.152  In con-
trast, patent law operates much more on an all-or-nothing basis.  
Either the subject matter is unpatentable and gets no protection153 
or is patentable and gets the full possible protection specified in the 
claims.154 
In large part, this all-or-nothing approach is a function of the 
peripheral-claiming system applicable to patents, in contrast to the 
gestalt work system of copyright law, which is like the central-
claiming system of patent law that preceded the present system in 
 
150. See e.g., Feist Publications., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
151. See e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 
1993). 
152. See, e.g., Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992), 
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1582 (1993) (excusing wholesale disassembly of video game com-
puter program to find and overcome copyright owner’s expedients preventing compatibil-
ity); Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 507 U.S. 985 (1993) (excusing video game accessory that improves ability of play-
ers to play games by temporarily modifying video game computer program).  But see Lotus 
Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an equally divided 
Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (eschewing the use of the fair use doctrine to titrate copyright 
protection and instead holding subject matter uncopyrightable). 
153. See e.g., Rubber-Tip Pencil Co., Inc. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498 (1874). 
154. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (con-
firming that the doctrine of equivalents gives patentees legal protection over technical 
expedients equivalent to those described and claimed in patent). 
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which claims measure and define the scope of the grant.155  The 
basic test of copyright infringement is whether the accused work, 
considered as a whole, is “substantially similar” in its expression to 
the expressive aspects of the copyright-protected work.156  It is 
thus much less difficult to expand or curtail copyright protection as 
a function of parameters considered legally significant than it is to 
attempt the same exercise with a patent claim, which speaks for it-
self.157 
Even patent law recognizes some exceptions, however, particu-
larly in the area of equivalency.  Thus, a pioneer patent is accorded 
a greater range of equivalents than a patent in a crowded art.  
Moreover, a means-plus-function claim is interpreted to extend to 
the structural expedients that the specification describes for carry-
ing out a function and expedients recognized as equivalent to them, 
but not to materially different structures.  Finally, a claim will be 
interpreted narrowly to preserve its validity against prior art, if that 
is reasonably possible.  Despite these perhaps marginal deviations, 
the claims system of determining patent infringement is orders of 
magnitude less flexible or latitudinarian than copyright law’s “sub-
stantially similar,” gestalt system for determining copyright in-
fringement. 
For these reasons, one must recognize that there is some diffi-
culty in adapting the doctrine of scènes à faire to patent law.  Nev-
ertheless, the difficulties are not insurmountable.  Moreover, patent 
law has opened the door to some steps in this direction. 
If one wanted to adapt the doctrine of scènes à faire to patent 
law, through legislation or case law, it would not seem overly dif-
ficult.  In a sense, scènes à faire is a doctrine using an abstraction 
continuum, just as the idea/expression doctrine and the ordinary 
patent doctrine relating to natural principles and abstract ideas do.  
It is less overt under scènes à faire, yet nonetheless the case.  Any 
 
155. See id at 26 n.4.  A peripheral claim specifies the elements of claimed subject 
matter and is intended to specify precisely the boundaries between claimed and unclaimed 
subject matter.  A central claim identifies the core inventive concept and reviewing courts 
decide how much penumbra is protected. 
156. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 
157. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 344 
(1961).  In theory, the claim is the sole measure of a patent grant. 
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analytic category, so long as it defines neither a null class nor a 
universal class, must involve some sort of continuum.  For exam-
ple, consider the Second Circuit’s ruling that the scène à faire for a 
movie about the South Bronx would feature drunks, prostitutes, 
vermin (rats, in the accused and copyrighted works), and derelict 
cars.  The principle must have a limit, so that something is outside 
scènes à faire for South Bronx movies.  Perhaps, cockroaches, 
gangs, and muggings are also part of the scène à faire, but having 
as characters a slumlord with a heart of gold and a policeman who 
is a Zen Bhuddist and lives in a garage surely goes beyond the 
South Bronx scène à faire.  There must be some expression possi-
ble even in a cliche-ridden genre. 
The same should be true for business scènes à faire as well.  In 
the case of a computer program for complying with tax laws gov-
erning pooled-fund partnerships, there is clearly considerable room 
for arbitrary expression.  The order in which particular operations 
are carried out, which operations are combined in particular sub-
routines, and a host of other programming choices are likely to be 
arbitrary and reflective of individual programmers’ respective de-
sign or style preferences.  In the case of a patent, there are always 
dependent claims.  Claim 1 may be within scènes à faire, but claim 
19 need not be.  To be sure, the claims drafter will want to have 
generic claim 1 that preempts the relevant scène à faire, but the 
point of any doctrine here is to deny such claims and allow only 
non-preemptive claims. 
Of course, every claim “preempts” whatever is the subject mat-
ter of that claim.  The task of applying a doctrine against undue 
preemption is to limit the preemptiveness of allowed claims to an 
extent as will allow others to operate within the applicable business 
genre that has the given scène à faire.  Addressing that comprehen-
sively in this or any other paper is no more practicable than ad-
dressing how long a piece of string should be.  Perhaps, it is suffi-
cient simply to state that the task should be performed in the same 
way that courts decide scènes à faire issues.  If one must use 
analogies, the process amounts to retreating from whether there is 
domination of the market for purposes of monopolization158 to 
 
158. Compare United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) 
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whether there is the kind of competitive impact qualifying as a 
substantial lessening of competition159 or an undue restraint of 
trade.160 
The simplest way patent law could embrace scènes à faire 
would be merely to let the doctrine inform the courts’ interpreta-
tion of section 101.  Until the State Street panel opinion, case law 
on statutory subject matter uniformly spoke of methods of doing 
business as unpatentable.  It would be no great wrench simply to 
go back to the status quo ante.  However, the Federal Circuit 
clearly chose not to do that sua sponte by setting the case for re-
hearing en banc after the State Street draft opinion was circulated, 
apparently for a year or more before it was published.161  More-
over, the Supreme Court showed no present interest in addressing 
the matter when it denied certiorari.162  Arguably, a different Fed-
 
(finding lack of monopoly power), with United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-
71 (1966) (finding monopoly power). 
159. For purposes of Clayton Anti-Trust Act, ch. 323, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1994), 
compare Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) (finding no substan-
tial lessening of competition), with Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 
(1949) (finding substantial lessening of competition).  For purposes of Clayton Anti-Trust 
Act, ch. 323 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18, compare United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 
U.S. 321 (1963) (finding substantial lessening of competition); Brown Shoe Co. v. United 
States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (same), with United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981 
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding no substantial lessening of competition).  See also Gulf Oil Corp. 
v. Copp Paving Co., Inc., 419 U.S. 186, 201 (1974) (sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act 
were “intended to complement the Sherman Act and to facilitate achievement of its pur-
poses by reaching, in their incipiency, acts and practices that promise, in their full growth, to 
impair competition in interstate commerce.”). 
160. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (presuming that restraint 
of trade embracing less than 30% of market does not unreasonably restrain trade). 
161. 149 F.3d 1368.  Oral argument occurred well over a year before publication of 
the opinion. 
162. Admittedly, a reversal of a summary judgment is not the best vehicle for certio-
rari in a test case.  Conceivably, the Court might be more hospitable to a final judgment 
raising the same legal issues.  Moreover, the denial of certiorari at this time should not be 
considered a decision on the merits nor even a determination by the Court that it has no in-
terest in the matter.  It is almost 20 years since the Supreme Court last addressed the pat-
entability of computer software.  During that interval, the Federal Circuit has increasingly 
distinguished prior Supreme Court decisions in this field to the point of extinction, and in 
State Street said in almost so many words that at least one of those decisions, Gottschalk v. 
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), is no longer good law.  149 F.3d at 1374.  That the Federal 
Circuit has put itself into the business of overruling the Supreme Court may have been in-
sufficiently emphasized in the State Street certiorari petition.  The time may simply not 
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eral Circuit panel might decline to follow the State Street panel 
opinion, on the basis of its inconsistency with statements, in earlier 
Federal Circuit opinions163 and other court opinions that methods 
of doing business were unpatentable.  Arguably, this inconsistency 
invokes an exception to the Federal Circuit’s rule that a later panel 
opinion must follow an earlier panel opinion unless and until it is 
reversed en banc.  Under that theory, the State Street panel deci-
sion would be non-precedential, as ultra vires.164  To be sure, 
whether a Federal Circuit panel would take this course is, at best, 
unpredictable.  More likely, this is not the kind of issue that the 
court, as now constituted, would wish to address.  Indeed, in April 
1999 a different Federal Circuit panel went out of its way to ap-
prove the reasoning of State Street and repudiate earlier opinions 
inconsistent with it.165  Even if, as it is only reasonable now to pre-
 
have been good for certiorari in still another patent case.  The Court just granted certiorari 
in two other patent cases, Lehman v. Zurko, 119 S. Ct. 401 (1998) (concerning the applica-
tion of the Administrative Procedure Act to the PTO), and Florida Prepaid Educ. Board v. 
College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1998) (concerning state sovereign immunity under the 
11th amendment in patent infringement cases), both of which may have seemed to present 
more urgent demands for the Court’s attention, and the Court had just handed down its deci-
sion in another patent case, Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998) (concerning 
proper statutory construction of “on sale” bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102 (b)). 
163. See e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 
(Fed. Cir. 1989); and In re Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1979).  See supra text ac-
companying notes 64-72. 
164. See generally Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992) (discussing when a later panel is entitled to disregard an earlier panel opinion on 
the ground that the latter ignored or flouted applicable law such as determinative Supreme 
Court precedent). 
165. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999), 
cert. denied, 68 U.S.L.W. 3079 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1999) (No. 99-95).  The author of the panel 
opinion expressly repudiated as passé the approach of an earlier Federal Circuit decision, 
In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994), which he had authored and which had 
sought to synthesize and harmonize the prior body of case law.  In Schrader, in direct 
contradiction of State Street, the court had held that transformation of a first data set rep-
resentative of financial information to a second data set representative of other financial 
information was unpatentable.  Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 294; State Street, 149 F.3d 1368.  
Like State Street, the Excel opinion accepts as appropriately patent-eligible a claim to 
such a data manipulation, so long as the result is economically useful.  Excel, 172 F.3d at 
1357-58; State Street, 149 F.3d 1368.  Since the claim in the Excel case was for a method 
permitting a telephone carrier to bill customers at differential rates depending on whether 
they called persons using the same carrier or a different one, this clearly useful and 
doubtless profitable expedient qualified as statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 
and under the State Street test. Excel, 172 F.3d at 1357-58. 
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dict, the Federal Circuit proves unwilling to reverse the course 
taken in State Street, losing defendants in patent infringement 
cases will give the Supreme Court another opportunity to clarify 
the law.166  Moreover, as has already been suggested in commen-
tary,167 corrective legislation is a possibility.168 
 
 The supposed invention in the Excel case involved creating an additional data field in a 
message record for a telephone call, so that a first datum indicating the caller’s carrier and a 
second datum indicating the called person’s carrier would be provided.  172 F.3d at 1354.  
For example, datum-1 and datum-2 are respectively 1 for AT&T and 0 for non-AT&T.  The 
billing method “ANDs” the data in this field (i.e., takes the logical product of the data val-
ues).  If the result is 1, that means that an AT&T customer called another AT&T customer.  
Any other combination produces a 0.  Messages for which the result is 1 are billed at the 
AT&T-to-AT&T rate; other messages are billed at another rate. 
166. See supra note 162. 
167. See supra note 97. 
168. There has already been a very limited legislative response to State Street.  See 
H.R. 1907, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. (1999), The Patent Reform and PTO Reorganization 
Bill (short title, “American Inventors’ Protection Act of 1999”), which passed the House 
of Representatives on August 4, 1999, 376-43 (roll call; the bill passed the preceding day 
by voice vote).  Title II of the bill (§ 202 of the bill) adds a new §273 to the patent code 
(to be codified as 35 U.S.C. § 273), which creates a “first inventor defense” to a charge of 
patent infringement of a method claim.  In new § 273(a)(3), “method” is defined “a 
method of doing or conducting business.”  An accused infringer that reduced the business 
method to practice at least a year before the filing date of the patent, and actually used the 
method commercially before the filing date, is excused from infringement liability and 
so, too, are its customers for products of the method.  35 U.S.C. §273(b)(1)-(2).  In de-
bate, the floor manager (Rep. Coble) for the bill explained that this provision was in-
tended to limit the effect of the State Street decision.  CONG. REC. H6942 (Aug. 3, 1999 
daily ed.).  Later in the debate, a supporter of the bill described this provision as a re-
sponse to a decision that had “changed patent law.”  Id. at 6943.  Other remarks of the 
same speaker, however, indicate that the real point of the provision, which was a nar-
rowed version of an earlier more pervasive prior use defense applicable to all inventions, 
was not so much to cut back on State Street as it was to narrow the prior use defense as 
much as possible to satisfy opponents of that defense.  Id. at 6944. 
 As worded, the bill fails to cover the Boes patent that the State Street decision up-
held, since the bill is limited to method claims.  The means-plus-function claims of the 
Boes patent are apparatus claims rather than method claims, although, as the Federal Cir-
cuit has repeatedly recognized, the distinction is not meaningful.  See, e.g., AT&T Corp. 
v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d at 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999), (“[W]e consider the 
scope of § 101 to be the same regardless of the form—machine or process—in which a 
particular claim is drafted.”); State Street, 149 F.3d at 1372 (“for the purposes of a § 101 
analysis, it is of little relevance whether claim 1 is directed to a ‘machine’ or a ‘proc-
ess’”); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Rader, J. concurring) (“In 
fact, whether the invention is a process or a machine is irrelevant [under § 101].”); In re 
Trovato, 42 F.3d 1376, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 1994), vacated on other grounds, 60 F.3d 807 
(Fed. Cir. 1995).  To accomplish its purpose, however, since form rules over substance in 
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If one wanted to apply the scènes à faire doctrine to patent law 
in the least obtrusive manner, that could be done by revisiting the 
issues of State Street in another business-method patent infringe-
ment case.  The legal rule that I would propose follows: 
Where a claim is directed to a business method, irrespective of 
whether it is claimed as a machine, process, or other patent cate-
gory, public policy concerns underlying section 101169 require that 
 
patent law, the provision in this bill should cover methods of doing business, whether 
claimed as a process or otherwise. 
 Despite the plain wording of the bill limiting its coverage to process patents, the 
House Report states: 
An invention is considered to be a process or method if it is used in connection 
with the production of a useful end-product or -service and is or could have 
been claimed in the form of a business process or method in a patent.  A soft-
ware-related invention, for example, that was claimed by the patent draftsman 
as a programmed machine when the same invention could have been protected 
with process or method patent claims is a process or method for purposes of 
273. 
H.R. Rep. No. 106-287 (1999). 
 It is questionable that the Federal Circuit, or other courts, would give much weight to 
this legislative history statement which seems to contradict the narrowness of the statutory 
definition.  See, e.g., Chicago v. Environmental. Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 337 (1994) 
(“But it is the statute, and not the Committee Report, which is the authoritative expression 
of the law . . . .); Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73, 81 n.2 (1990) (“In any case, the 
legislative history is overborne by the text.”).  That would seem particularly so when it 
would have been quite easy to have written the definition more broadly.  For example, the 
definition of method could have been made “a method of doing or conducting business, 
whether claimed as a process, apparatus, or otherwise,” where the italicized words are my 
addition. 
169. 35 U.S.C. §101 (1994).  The public policy concerns include The Statute of Mo-
nopolies, 21 Jac. I, ch. 3, §§5-6, on which the patent system is ultimately based.  Graham 
v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966) (stating that the patent clause of Constitution 
“was written against the backdrop of practices “eventually curtailed by the Statute of 
Monopolies of the crown in granting monopolies to court favorites in goods or businesses 
which had long before been enjoyed by the public.”); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel 
Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 169 n.2 
(1931); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 11, 20 (1829).  The East India Tea Com-
pany’s detested monopoly on tea (terminated by the Boston Tea Party) has also been said 
to be part of the backdrop of the patent clause.  United States v. Line Material Co., 333 
U.S. 287, 329-31, 337-38 (1948) (Burton, J., dissenting) (asserting also that resentment of 
the tea monopoly precipitated the American Revolution).  See also In re Shao Wen Yuan, 
188 F.2d 377, 380 (C.C.P.A. 1951) (stating that inclusion of preamble words “to promote 
the progress of science and useful arts” was placed in patent clause because “those who 
formulated the Constitution were familiar with the long struggle over monopolies so 
prominent in English history, where exclusive rights to engage even in ordinary business 
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certain broad claims be considered as not directed to the kind of 
machine or process (or other category of subject matter) that the 
patent system was intended to protect.  This rule applies when a 
business-method patent claims what amounts to the scène à faire 
of the business that it impacts.  The doctrine of scènes à faire ap-
plies when those wishing to engage in the affected business cannot, 
as a practical matter, engage in the business without infringing the 
patent. 
A business, for this purpose, is defined as, dealing in any prod-
uct or service whose marketing is recognized by the public or trade 
as a distinct, definable product or service, irrespective of whether it 
constitutes a relevant market in the sense of statutes using that 
concept.170  Thus, what courts will consider a genre for purposes of 
the doctrine of scènes à faire in copyright law is more expansive 
than the relevant market in which dealers in works in the genre 
compete with one another, for works in different genres compete 
for the same consumer dollar.171  The business of managing a 
pooled-fund partnership in a way that complies with the applicable 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code is an example of a busi-
ness for purposes of the patent law analog of scènes à faire.  By 
the same token, it would be a business for purposes of section 101 
of the patent code, as the understanding of that section is informed 
by the public policies underlying section 101 as well as those sup-
 
activities were granted so frequently by the Crown”). 
 For an extended discussion of the effect of 16th century monopoly grants on the devel-
opment of both the patent and copyright systems.  See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 
911 F.2d 970, 974-75 (4th Cir. 1990). 
170. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §271 (d) (1994): 
“No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory 
infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or il-
legal extension of the patent right by reason of his having. . .(5) conditioned the 
license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the ac-
quisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate prod-
uct, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in 
the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license or 
sale is conditioned.” 
Id. 
171. See, e.g., Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 583 (2d Cir. 1996) (commenting on 
Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986)).  
The motion picture found to be in a genre having unprotected scènes à faire was clearly in 
competition with other motion pictures of other genres. 
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porting a doctrine of scènes à faire.172  Similarly, any investment 
product, such as the tender offer program of the Merritt Forbes 
case,173 if recognized by investors or underwriters as a distinct se-
curities product, would be comparable to a genre under the copy-
right doctrine of scènes à faire and it would be a business under 
the proposed patent law analog of that doctrine. 
V.  SHOULD PATENT LAW TREAT BUSINESS METHODS UNDER 
SCÈNES À FAIRE? 
Over at least the last decade, copyright law has been more suc-
cessful than patent law in deciding the extent to which computerre-
lated or computer-implemented innovations should be accorded le-
gal protection.  That is especially true for business-method, com-
puter-implemented innovations.  Of course, this involves com-
paring bodies of law so different that the value of any very general 
comparison can properly be questioned.  Nonetheless, I believe 
that treating business methods under a version of the doctrine of 
scènes à faire makes more sense than the Federal Circuit’s ap-
proach, which is to abolish section 101’s filter against nonstatutory 
subject matter while offering only an illusory promise that sections 
102, 103, and 112 will address whatever problems there are.174 
Right now, an open season appears to be in effect for patents 
directed to every new (or old) IRS regulation or comparable gov-
ernmental or quasi-governmental requirement.  At the same time, 
an Oklahoma land rush is proceeding in which patent-happy entre-
preneurs try to stake out their claims to plots of electronic com-
merce in cyberspace.  Whether objecting to this is a hysterical 
over-reaction175 or the same justifiable dislike of business monopo-
 
172. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).  The State Street panel of the Federal Circuit cannot be 
faulted for failure to consider this point.  This issue was not specifically brought to the atten-
tion of the court in that case, and therefore the court had no opportunity to pass upon it.  
Another Federal Circuit panel could emphasize this factor as a basis for not considering it-
self bound by the State Street decision on this point.  Moreover, if the banking and financial 
services industries were sufficiently concerned to seek legislation in this field, such matters 
as stare decisis and distinguishing case law would have little weight. 
173. Merrit Forbes & Co., Inc. v. Newman Inv. Sec., Inc., 604 F.Supp. 943 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
174. 35 U.S.C. §§102, 103, 112 (1994). 
175. See supra note 95. 
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lies that led to the Boston Tea Party remains to be seen.  In my 
view, to encourage speculation of this kind is as bad for the patent 
system as it would be to encourage submarine patents, and for 
much the same reasons.176  It does not significantly augment the 
delivery to the public of business innovations.  It does generate 
litigation costs, and it raises the cost of actually delivering business 
innovations to the public, by unproductively mulcting businesses 
engaged in delivering such innovations to the public. 
Other papers prepared for this Symposium treat the policy mer-
its of the State Street opinion in depth, and it would be redundant 
for this paper to attempt to cover the same ground.  Accordingly, 
only one facet of the policy merits question is addressed here.  This 
facet concerns the wisdom of adopting the scènes à faire doctrine 
and other Symposium papers do not focus on it.  The fundamental 
rationale of the patent system is that monopoly awards are a consti-
tutionally sanctioned means for promoting the progress of science 
and useful arts.  Therefore, if copyright law does not protect busi-
ness methods as such should not patent law fill in this gap in legal 
protection? 
Support for that argument might be gleaned from a passage in 
Baker v. Selden stating that a grant of a monopoly over the art 
taught in a book “is the province of letters-patent, not of copy-
right.”177  This passage might be read to suggest that bookkeeping 
systems, and by extension business schemes such as those of the 
Merritt Forbes and State Street cases, are not properly the province 
of copyright law, but they are properly the province of patents.  For 
several reasons, this reads too much into the remark.  Given the 
overwhelming weight of authority at the time and continuing until 
recently that methods of doing business were unpatentable, the 
 
176. See Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883). 
177. The statement reads: 
To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art described 
therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, 
would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public.  That is the province of letters-
patent, not of copyright.  The claim to an invention or discovery of an art or 
manufacture must be subjected to the examination of the Patent Office before 
an exclusive right therein can be obtained; and it can only be secured by a pat-
ent from the government. 
Baker, 101 U.S. at 102. 
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Court could not have meant to hold the contrary.  The Court’s 
comments do not even rise to the level of obiter dicta, moreover, 
since the Court made it clear elsewhere in the opinion that it de-
clined to address the matter.178 
More pervasively, that something is unpatentable does not of 
itself make it a proper subject of copyright protection, and vice 
versa.  Many things are subject to neither copyright nor patent pro-
tection.  Examples are abstract ideas, laws of nature, and mathe-
matical algorithms.  So, too, are style schemes, such as terza rima, 
gangsta rap, sonata allegro, and cubism.  Even aside from enable-
ment and inoperativeness issues, spells and incantations, and reve-
lations from the beyond, are protectable neither by patents nor 
copyrights, for they are putative facts or putative laws of nature.  
That business schemes are not protected by copyright does not, of 
itself, make them patentable. 
Finally, the question is not quite so absolute as “either/or.”  
Adoption of a version of the doctrine of scènes à faire is not an ab-
solute rule against patenting any and all systems or methods of do-
ing business.  As has been suggested earlier in this paper, not every 
element in a cliche-ridden work is non-expressive.  Scènes à faire 
is a doctrine against preempting a genre (or, at least, seriously im-
pairing the ability of others to express themselves in the genre), not 
one stripping non-preemptive protection from works in a genre.  
Where, and to the extent that, patents claiming business methods 
do not substantially prevent others from engaging in the same 
business, a doctrine of scènes à faire will not bar the patents.  Ac-
cordingly, I suggest that incorporation of the doctrine into patent 
law for business systems would significantly improve the perform-
ance and rationality of patent law.179 
 
178. Thus, the Court said, “Whether the art might or might not have been patented is a 
question which is not before us.”  Id. at 104. 
179. Brief mention should be given an objection that may be raised against incorpo-
ration of scènes à faire into patent law or this part of it.  It may be said that scènes à faire 
is just a fancy name for analytical dissecting out certain parts of a claim and treating them 
as if they were in the prior art, à la Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).  Alternatively, 
this may be said to be resurrection of the point-of-novelty approach, now taboo in the 
Federal Circuit.  Compare Flook, 437 U.S. at 594-5 which adopted the point-of-novelty 
approach to algorithm-related inventions) with Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, 
Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1543 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1385 n.8 
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CONCLUSION 
The State Street opinion is magisterial only in the pejorative 
sense.  Its cavalier treatment of precedent and cursory legal analy-
sis should earn it Atlantic Thermoplastic treatment.180  No basis ex-
ists, however, for predicting that result in the foreseeable future.  
Accordingly, a line of subsequent poor decisions based on State 
Street should be anticipated.  Given the boom or land rush in ap-
plications for patents on methods of doing business, particularly in 
regard to electronic commerce, the matter is urgent.  That was, of 
course, a reason for this Symposium. 
The copyright doctrine of scènes à faire, adapted to patent law, 
offers a realistic and workable limiting doctrine for scope of pat-
ents on methods of doing business.  It is a minimalist doctrine and 
requires no wholesale overhaul of patent law.  Further, it is suitable 
for judicial application.  A substantial body of copyright precedent 
already exists.181  The argument is available, moreover, that State 
 
(Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 765-57 (C.C.P.A. 1980) which states that 
application of point-of-novelty approach to algorithm-related inventions “would immeas-
urably debilitate the patent system.”  See also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188-89 
(1981) (declining to follow Flook analytic dissection of algorithm out of claimed subject 
matter before determination of whether subject matter is patent-eligible). 
 Both of these would be incorrect characterizations of the proposed approach.  The pro-
posal here is not to dissect elements out of the claim as a preliminary matter before evaluat-
ing whether the subject matter is statutory.  Rather, the proposal is to determine whether the 
claim, considered as a whole, preempts a business.  If the claim is not thus preemptive, it 
does not fail under the doctrine of scènes à faire.  If the claim is preemptive of a business, a 
scènes à faire analysis will conclude that the claimed subject matter is not the kind of proc-
ess or machine that section 101 makes eligible for patent protection.  If anything, this is just 
an elaboration of the doctrinal approach of Diehr, which holds that a claim is directed to 
nonstatutory subject matter if it preempts an algorithm. 450 U.S. at 193, n.14.  Indeed, the 
language of this approach is much the same as that of Diehr - with the term business substi-
tuted for algorithm or equation.  See, e.g., id. at 187 (“Their process admittedly employs a 
well-known mathematical equation, but they do not seek to pre-empt the use of that equa-
tion.”), 191 (“We recognize, of course, that when a claim recites a mathematical formula (or 
scientific principle or phenomenon of nature), an inquiry must be made into whether the 
claim is seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract.  A mathematical formula 
as such is not accorded the protection of our patent laws . . . .”). 
180. See Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
181. Moreover, since these methods are typically computer-implemented, in fact 
computer software-implemented, a generally parallel patent and copyright treatment of ab-
straction in this manner would contribute toward harmonization, and would further ration-
alization, of law.  No legitimate public policy is advanced by disparate treatment of busi-
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Street, itself, did not foreclose its application because State Street 
did not present or decide any scènes à faire issue.  The doctrine 
does not appear to have any unsettling, unintended side effects —
none have emerged so far under copyright law. 
For these reasons, legislative or case law adaptation of scènes à 
faire to the patent law of methods of doing business would provide 
a useful limiting principle for addressing the perceived problems 
that such patents have raised.  It would provide a way to titrate the 
scope of legal protection of business methods to degrees of ab-
straction, tangibility, and preemptiveness, in terms of a known and 
rational organizing principle. 
 
ness-method computer programs under 35 U.S.C. § 101 on the one hand and under 17 
U.S.C. § 102(b) and related judicial doctrines on the other hand. 
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APPENDIX A 
Side-by-side Comparison of Boes Patent 5,193,056 and 
Tax Law Concerning Flow-Through of Pool Income to a 
Partner and Avoidance of Taxation of the Pool Entity 
 
 Patent 
1.  A data process-
ing system for man-
aging a financial 
services configura-
tion of a portfolio 
established as a 
partnership, each 
partner being one of 
a plurality of funds, 
comprising: 
(a)  computer proc-
essor means for 
processing data; 
(b)  storage means 
for storing data on a 
storage medium; 
(c)  first means for 
initializing the stor-
age medium; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tax Law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[This part of claim 1 is di-
rected to a computer for 
processing data and having 
access to a source of stored 
data to be processed in the 
computer.] 
—— 
 
 
26 U.S.C. § 706(d)(2)(A): [I]f during 
any taxable year of the partnership 
there is a change in any partner’s in-
terest in the partnership, . . .each 
partner’s distributive share of any al-
locable cash basis item shall be de-
termined—(i) by assigning the ap-
propriate portion of such item to 
each day in the period to which it is 
attributable, and (ii) by allocating the 
portion assigned to any such day 
among the partners in proportion to 
their interests in the partnership at 
the close of such day. 
IRS Reg. 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv) 
(a): Except as otherwise provided in 
paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(i) of this section, 
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(d)  second means 
for processing data 
regarding assets in 
the portfolio and 
each of the funds 
from a previous day 
and data regarding 
increases or de-
creases in each of 
the funds, assets and 
for allocating the 
percentage share 
that each fund holds 
in the portfolio; 
(e)  third means for 
processing data re-
garding daily incre-
mental income, ex-
penses, and net 
realized gain or loss 
for the portfolio and 
an allocation of income, gain, loss, or 
deduction will not have economic ef-
fect under paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this 
section, and will not be deemed to be 
in accordance with a partner’s inter-
est in the partnership under para-
graph (b)(4) of this section [i.e., 
qualify for partnership flow-
through treatment], unless the capi-
tal accounts of the partners are deter-
mined and maintained throughout the 
full term of the partnership [i.e., 
daily] in accordance with the capital 
accounting rules of this paragraph 
(b)(2)(iv). 
. . .(b)(2)(iv): [T]he partners’ capital 
accounts will be considered to be de-
termined and maintained in accor-
dance with the rules of this paragraph 
(b)(2)(iv) if, and only if, each part-
ner’s capital account: . . . 
—— 
is increased by (1) the amount of 
money contributed by him to the 
partnership. . .and is decreased by (4) 
the amount of money distributed to 
him by the partnership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
is increased by (3) allocations to him 
of partnership income and 
gain. . .and is decreased by (6) allo-
cations to him of expenditures of the 
partnership. . .and (7) allocations of 
partnership loss 
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for allocating such 
data among each 
fund; 
(f)  fourth means for 
processing data re-
garding daily net un-
realized gain or loss 
for the portfolio and 
for allocating such 
data among each 
fund; and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(g)  fifth means for 
processing data re-
garding aggregate 
year-end income, 
expenses, and capi-
tal gain or loss for 
the portfolio and 
each of the funds. 
 
 
 
 
IRS Reg. 1.704-1(f) A partnership 
agreement may, upon the occurrence 
of certain events, increase or de-
crease the capital accounts of the 
partners to reflect a revaluation of 
partnership property. . . Capital ac-
counts so adjusted will not be con-
sidered to be determined and main-
tained in accordance with the rules of 
this paragraph (b)(2)(iv) unless— . . . 
(2) The adjustments reflect the man-
ner in which the unrealized income, 
gain, loss, or deduction inherent in 
such property (that has not been re-
flected in the capital accounts previ-
ously) would be allocated among the 
partners if there were a taxable dis-
position of such property for such 
fair market value on that date 
26 U.S.C. § 706(d)(1): [I]f during 
any taxable year of the partnership 
there is a change in any partner’s in-
terest in the partnership, each part-
ner’s distributive share of any item of 
income, gain, loss, deduction, or 
credit of the partnership for such tax-
able year shall be determined by the 
use of any method prescribed by the 
Secretary by regulations which takes 
into account the varying interests of 
the partners in the partnership during 
such taxable year. 
 
 
 
